I\u27m Still Your Baby: Canada\u27s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals by Bouchard, Ron A.
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 1
I'm Still Your Baby: Canada's Continuing Support
of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals
Ron A. Bouchard
University of Manitoba, Canada
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Ron A. Bouchard, I'm Still Your Baby: Canada's Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 Intellectual
Property L. Rev. 71 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss1/1
  
 
I’M STILL YOUR BABY: CANADA’S 
CONTINUING SUPPORT OF U.S. LINKAGE 
REGULATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 
  RON A. BOUCHARD∗ 
 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................... 72 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 73 
I.  REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES............................................................ 77 
A.  Study 1 ........................................................................................... 77 
B.  Study 2 ............................................................................................ 83 
C.  Study 3 ............................................................................................ 88 
D.  Interpretation ................................................................................. 94 
II. ARE THE REGULATIONS A SUCCESS? ................................................... 97 
A.  Debate Preceding Bill C-91 ......................................................... 99 
B.  “Original Policy Intent” ............................................................. 107 
C.  “Patent-Specific” Analysis ......................................................... 115 
D.  Statutory Interpretation .............................................................. 121 
E.  Revisiting the Empirical Data .................................................... 126 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL LAW AND POLICY ........... 130 
A.  Theory of Linkage-Based Drug Development ........................ 130 
B.  Globalization of Pharmaceutical Linkage ................................ 133 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 143 
 
 
 
 
  
 
∗Dr. Ron A. Bouchard is Visiting Professor in the Faculties of Law and Medicine at the 
University of Manitoba, Canada.  The author is grateful to Richard Hawkins, Joel Lexchin, 
Alex Stack, and David Vaver for comments on earlier drafts, and to Monika Sawicka, Jamil 
Sawani, Chris McLelland, Kirsten Burrows, and Cam Sklar for excellent research assistance 
at varying stages of the work.  The study was funded by a career establishment award from 
the Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research (AHFMR) and a New Investigator 
Award from the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR).  Correspondence to: 
ron.a.bouchard@gmail.com. 
72 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 15:1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Canada’s linkage regime for pharmaceuticals, modeled after the 
originating U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime, was brought in under intense 
political pressure to balance effective patent enforcement over new and 
innovative drugs with the timely market entry of lower-priced generic 
competitors.  It has been almost two decades since the regulations were 
enacted, and to date, there has been little objective assessment as to 
whether the regulations have, in fact, stimulated innovation and timely 
generic entry.  We recently completed three empirical studies on the 
linkage between drug approval and drug patenting under the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC Regulations).  Of 
particular interest was the nexus between the innovative character of 
new and follow-on drugs approved by Canadian regulators and the 
scope of intellectual property protection afforded to these drugs via 
operation of linkage regulations.  The first study focused on the type of 
brand-name and generic drug approvals over an eight-year term 
following the coming into force of the linkage regime and leading up to 
the debate on progressive licensing of drug products.  The second was 
an analysis of patenting characteristics for therapeutic products before 
and after the coming into force of the NOC Regulations.  That study 
also involved a detailed analysis of patent and therapeutic classes in 
which multinational drug companies are focusing their attention and 
how these can be used to support various types of new and follow-on 
drug development.  The third was a more nuanced analysis of the 
innovative nature of new and follow-on drugs approved by regulators 
over this time frame coupled with an investigation into how patent 
monopoly periods for pharmaceuticals were extended via the linkage 
regulations.  The implications of the data for the vires of pharmaceutical 
linkage are discussed in light of the stated goals of government to 
stimulate new and innovative drug development and facilitate timely 
entry of generic products and, thus, to balance the goals and objectives 
of food and drug law with those of enabling patent legislation.  The 
Article finishes with a brief description of the global evolution of 
pharmaceutical linkage and raises issues for further research into local 
and global systems of pharmaceutical law and policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC 
Regulations)1 came into force in 1993 as part of Canada’s perceived 
obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA to support the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry.2  The original policy intent of the regulations, 
as outlined in successive government Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statements (RIAS), was to encourage the development of new and 
innovative drugs and facilitate the timely market entry of generic drugs, 
and thus, to balance the goals and objectives of food and drug law with 
those of patent law.  Prior to the linkage regime coming into force, drug 
regulation and drug patenting represented distinct goals and policy 
objectives.3  This balancing exercise is a familiar one to the intellectual 
property bar owing to the quid pro quo of the traditional patent bargain.  
Thus, under the terms of the linkage regime, there must be a specific 
functional legal nexus between approved drugs and patent protection 
for those drugs pursuant to the NOC Regulations. 
As appreciated in the early literature on topic,4 it was not output 
metrics but a combination of lobbying by the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry, its hopeful domestic university funding partners, and a federal 
government bent on harmonizing the Canadian system of intellectual 
 
1. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993-133. (Can). 
[hereinafter Patented Medicines Regulations]. 
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, T.S. No. 2 
(1994), 32 I.L.M. 289 (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States; 
entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) 1994, Oct. 30, 1947, T.S. No. 27 (1947), 58 U.N.T.S. 187 (negotiated as part 
of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) [hereinafter TRIPS]).   
3. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 
(Can.).  The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that until 1993, the two regulatory 
systems for drug approval and drug patenting were largely “kept distinct and separate.”  Id. at 
¶ 12.  Indeed, as late as 2003, Robert Peterson, Director General of the Therapeutics Product 
Directorate of Health Canada, stated before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science 
and Technology that the purpose of the drug submission structure was “to support drug 
review.  It was not designed with the aim of safeguarding intellectual property rights.”  
Michael C. Jordan, The Politics of Drug Patenting in Canada 102 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished 
M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan) (on file with the University of Saskatchewan, 
Electronic Thesis 7 Dissertation Project).  Regarding confusion over the precise nature of the 
approval-patenting nexus, Dr. Peterson stipulated “this in our view is one reason why the 
linkage aspects of the patented medicines NOC regulations are so hard to grapple with . . . .” 
Id.  For a detailed discussion of the political climate leading up the NOC Regulations, see id.  
4. See generally Robert Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Canada, THE INT’L EXEC., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 283; Christopher 
Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade 
Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 457, 460 (2000–2001) [hereinafter Harrison]. 
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property with that of the United States that led to enactment of the 
NOC Regulations.  Once the domestic U.S. policy environment was 
recalibrated away from nascent support for a Canadian-based system of 
price controls and towards preventing nations such as Canada from 
having systems of intellectual property law that were perceived to be 
based on “rights piracy,”5 stronger patent protection in Canada was 
inevitable.  However, with one notable exception,6 few independent 
observers would have guessed during the debate on patent reform that 
the linkage regime would potentially tip so far to the rights-protection 
end of the spectrum.  It has now been almost two decades since the 
regulations were enacted subsequent to Canada’s perceived obligations 
under NAFTA and TRIPS.  Given the continuing public debate over 
high drug prices,7 the large fraction of research and development carried 
out by publicly-funded institutions that is ultimately enveloped within 
commercialized products,8 and wide criticism of the failings of the patent 
 
5. This position was strongly advocated by numerous Canadian politicians, particularly 
those in the governing Conservative Party.  See generally Harrison, supra note 4, at 462–64; 
JORDAN, supra note 3; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on 
Bill C-91, 34:7 Parliament of Canada 7:65–96 (Dec. 1, 1992).  For example, Harvie Andre, 
Minister for Consumer and Corporate Affairs under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney referred 
to the 1969 bill authorizing compulsory licensing as “legalized theft” and that repeal of the 
same will indicate that Canada would not be “taking a free ride at the expense of the rest of 
the world.”  Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, apparently bowing to pressure from President 
Reagan at the time NAFTA was being negotiated, stated that the nation had acted “as a 
scavenger in the area of intellectual property.”  See e.g., Harrison, supra note 4, at 513; Alan 
Story, Drug Wars: Does Anyone Really Know the Price Tag?, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 20, 1986, 
B1; MARCI MCDONALD, YANKEE DOODLE DANDY: BRIAN MULRONEY AND THE 
AMERICAN AGENDA 211 (1995). 
6.  Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist, gave evidence 
before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term of single patents that 
mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively to extend market exclusivity, a claim 
the government at the time vigorously denied.  See infra Section IV.B.  Compare Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:7 Parliament of 
Canada, 7:65–96 (Dec. 1, 1992) and Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative 
Committee on Bill C-91, 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–40 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Dr. 
Stephen Schondelmeyer (Professor, University of Minnesota) and Dr. Elizabeth Dickson 
(Director General, Department of Industry, Science and Technology)). 
7. See generally PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, 
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (2003); JERRY AVORN, 
POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
(2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY 
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); JAY S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE 
AGAINST THE DRUG COMPANIES (2001). 
8. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE 
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003); Ron A. Bouchard, 
Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical 
Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 120, 158–64 (2007); Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, Commentary, Privatizing 
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system to promote innovation,9 it is an excellent time to assess whether 
the NOC Regulations have satisfied the twin policy goals of encouraging 
new and innovative drug development and the timely market entry of 
generic drugs.  We have chosen as the vehicle of our investigation, the 
growing field of empirical legal research. 
The empirical work reviewed and discussed here was designed to 
investigate whether and how the NOC Regulations have encouraged the 
development of new and innovative drugs since being enacted.  The 
importance of empirical studies to assessing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy levers such as intellectual property law and 
regulations cannot be overstated.  As noted by some of the most 
prominent economists, innovation scholars, and patent scholars over the 
last decades,10 robust conclusions regarding the consequences for 
 
Biomedical Research—a ‘Third Way’, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2008). 
9. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 
192–96 (2008) (finding only “weak or no evidence” that IP protection increases innovation); 
KRIMSKY, supra note 8. 
10. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the 
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531 (2000).  Jaffe notes that it is possible that the R&D 
boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s would not have been so large or lasted so long without 
enhanced IP rights, and that “[i]t is disquieting, however, that there is so little empirical 
evidence that what is widely perceived to be a significant strengthening of intellectual 
property protection had significant impact on the innovation process.”  Id. at 540.  Jaffe 
further observes that “[o]verall, there is a noticeable gap between the highly developed 
theoretical literature on patent scope and the limited empirical literature.”  Id. at 548.  This is 
due partially to the infrequency of changes in patent regimes like the one examined by 
Sakakibara and Branstetter.  Id. at 546.  “Part of the difficulty also lies in the weakness of the 
connection between the model constructs and quantifiable aspects of a patent regime.”  Id. at 
548.  Finally, Jaffe comments, “[t]his limited success is due partially to the difficulty of 
measuring the parameters of patent policy, and partly due to the difficulty of discerning 
statistically significant effects when many things have been changing at the same time.  But it 
should surely be viewed as a challenge to researchers to try to do more.”  Id. at 554.  See also 
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: 
A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 280 (1998): 
The range of arguments about the positive social value of patents is obviously much 
wider than the area that strong empirical studies explored to date. An analyst, citing 
the earlier empirical studies that appear to have shown only limited social value, 
obviously is vulnerable to the argument that those studies do not provide evidence 
on some of the possibly most important functions patents serve. . . . We cannot 
present here an empirically supported and intellectually persuasive argument on this 
broad question. The important empirical research that needs to be done in order to 
map out the basic facts simply has not been done yet . . . .  
Id. at 280.  BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 192.  In a meta-analysis of empirical studies 
of whether introducing or strengthening patent protection leads to greater innovation, 
Boldrin and Levine note, “[w]e have identified twenty-three economic studies that have 
examined this issue empirically. . . . The executive summary: these studies find weak or no 
evidence that strengthening patent regimes increases innovation; they find evidence that 
strengthening the patent regime increases . . . patenting!”  Id.  
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technological innovation of changes in patent law and policy are few 
and far between.  This is due primarily to a fundamental lack of relevant 
empirical data.  The same applies in the reverse, as governments have 
specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law and 
regulations, which are then reviewable by the courts in judicial review 
proceedings.  
We have recently published three studies that provide empirical data 
for analysis of whether pharmaceutical linkage regulations, in operation, 
are consistent with the intent of balancing the goals of patent law with 
those of food and drug law, while stimulating new and innovative drug 
development.  The data are relevant to all jurisdictions that have, or are 
currently contemplating bringing in, some form of linkage.  The first 
study focused on the types of new and follow-on drugs approved by 
Canadian regulators between 2001 and 2008.11  The year 2001 was chosen 
as our starting point, as this was the date when substantial amendments to 
Canadian drug regulation were made that affected both the mechanisms 
and speed of approval.12  The second study focused on patenting patterns 
associated with drugs identified in the first study.13  We analyzed the 
number of patents per drug, the number of patents listed on the patent 
register, and the timing of these metrics to one another and the date of 
drug approval.  We conducted tests on the statistical nature of the trends 
in patenting before and after the NOC Regulations came into force.  In 
addition, we analyzed patents and approved drugs in terms of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) Anatomic Therapeutic Class in order to 
identify therapeutic areas (cardiovascular, cancer, etc.) in which forms are 
focusing their drug development activities.  Finally, we developed an 
independent patent classification scheme to analyze the type (chemical, 
use, combination, etc.) of patents associated with approved drugs.  The 
third study focused on the legal nexus between drug approval and drug 
patenting in a subgroup of the most profitable drugs sold in Canada.14  
Our aim was to quantify patenting, patent listing, and patent litigation 
patterns associated with these drugs under the NOC Regulations and to 
investigate the manner in which patent terms on already approved 
 
11. Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug 
Approval Data 2001–2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With Less”?, 3 MCGILL 
J.L. & HEALTH 85 (2009).  
12. Id. at 107. 
13. Ron A. Bouchard, Richard W. Hawkins, Robert Clark, Ray Hagtvedt, & Jamil 
Sawani, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval–Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value 
Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 174 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard 2010]. 
14. Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W. 
Hawkins. The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading 
Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009) [hereinafter Bouchard 2009]. 
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blockbuster drugs were extended via operation of the linkage regime.  
The purpose of the present Article is to review data from these studies 
and to analyze them in light of the stated objectives of the NOC 
Regulations as well as relevant Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence 
and principles of statutory interpretation. 
I.  REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
A.  Study 1* 
Our first study (“Study 1”)15 was an analysis of drug approvals, 
referred to in Canada as Notices of Compliance (NOCs), issued over the 
period from 2001 to 2008.  Our goal was to develop an independent 
empirical methodology and synthetic model to investigate what types of 
drug candidates were approved by Canadian regulators over nearly a 
decade and to investigate which type of drugs might qualify for flexible 
departure under emerging lifecycle-based drug regulatory models.16  A 
related goal was to use this model to identify patterns in the rate (how 
much) and direction (what kind) of innovative activity by domestic 
brand name and generic pharmaceutical firms.  One methodological 
tool employed by our group was construction of “patent trees.”  Patent 
trees were used to assess the number, type, and timing of patents 
granted in relation to a specific drug or a group of related follow-on 
drugs, and these patent trees could be assessed and visualized.  An 
example of such an analysis is provided in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* For the full study, please refer to Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis 
of Canadian Drug Approval Data 2001–2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With 
Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85 (2009).  
15. See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11.   
16. This is referred to in Canadian pharmaceutical policy as “progressive licensing.”  
See generally HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD BRANCH, BLUEPRINT FOR RENEWAL: 
TRANSFORMING CANADA’S APPROACH TO REGULATING HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD, 
33 (2006), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/hpfb-dgpsa/blueprint-
plan-eng.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CANADA, BLUEPRINT]. See also Progressive Licensing 
Project, Health Canada, The Progressive Licensing Framework Concept Paper for Discussion 
(2006), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/proglic_homprog_concept-eng.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CANADA, 
PLF CONCEPT PAPER]; Neil Yeates et al., Health Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework, 
176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1845, 1845 (2007). 
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Fig 1.  Example of Search String and Patent Tree Analysis for Advair Diskus®. Patents were 
identified using the specific and general search strings described in the Methods.  In addition to 
quantifying patents per drug, this method also allows assessment of how specific drugs evolve into 
related drug forms or (in this case) drug products representing combinations of known drugs.  In 
addition, the patent tree analysis allows for identification of relevant patent types based on the 
classification nomenclature described in the Methods.  Finally, the patent tree analysis provides 
data relating to drug development, but also on the type of patents selected by pharmaceutical 
companies for listing on the patent register in order to prevent generics.  Reproduced courtesy of 
the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property.© 
 
We analyzed 3,837 drug approvals over the period from 2001 to 
2008, with a particular focus on the types of new and follow-on drugs 
being approved and the manner in which approvals were consistent with 
emerging lifecycle models of drug regulation.17  Of the cohort of 3,837 
approvals, 45% were administrative in nature (product manufacturer or 
name change), leaving 2,122 approvals for detailed analysis.  There were 
two related components of the work that were published in separate 
articles.  The first focused on approval statistics, whereas the second 
focused on the innovative character of approved drugs.  
Data from the first component demonstrated that the percentage of 
new drugs developed over the test period decreased substantially 
whereas the number and fraction of follow-on drug increased.  All three 
groups in the “new drug” category investigated experienced a decrease 
over time.  This included new drug submissions (NDSs) generally, and 
NDS submissions containing a new active substance (NAS) and those 
directed to First in Class drugs.  
By contrast, all four categories of “follow-on” drugs increased over 
 
17. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11, at 104.  See also Hans-Georg Eichler et al., 
Opinion, Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs with the Need for Benefit/Risk Data: A 
Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823–24 (2008).  
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the same time frame, sometimes dramatically.  Of the four groups 
followed, two represented brand-name submission classes (standard 
supplementary new drug submissions (SNDS) and First in Class 
SNDSs), and two represented generic submissions (standard 
abbreviated new drug submissions (ANDS) and supplemental ANDS, 
or SANDS).  SNDSs, also known as “line extensions” of previously 
existing products, usually involve changes to a pre-existing drug such as 
a change in the route of administration (e.g., oral to intravenous), 
dosage form (e.g., tablet to capsule), salt form (e.g., besylate to 
mesylate), or indication (e.g., antidepressant to anxiolytic).  For the 
most part, getting a line extension or SNDS onto the market is a faster 
process compared with drugs approved via the new drug submission 
stream.  This is true even where approval times for SNDS and NDS are 
roughly equal, as production and marketing of line extension products 
takes less time than producing and marketing truly new drugs, owing to 
manufacturing experience and related competencies.  
Drugs approved via NDS and SNDS routes can be classified as 
either First in Class or Me Too.  For the NDS route, First in Class drugs 
are those that contain either a new ingredient or are directed to a new 
use (or indication), whereas NDS Me Too drugs neither contain a new 
ingredient nor are directed to a new use, but do have an improved 
benefit/risk profile.  For the SNDS route, relatively small changes to 
existing chemical structures such as salts or isomers may still yield First 
in Class or Me Too designations.  The difference is that while both 
SNDS First in Class and Me Too drugs can cover new chemical forms, 
drugs directed only to a new use may be deemed First in Class SNDSs, 
while those that do not are deemed Me Too.  Because even a follow-on 
First in Class must be directed to a new use as opposed to just a new 
chemical form with altered benefit/risk, a higher level of innovation is 
typically ascribed to follow-on First in Class as opposed to Me Too 
drugs.18  
One of the most intriguing findings of Study 1 is that the number of 
new Me Too and First in Class NDS NOCs decreased slightly over the 
test period.  By contrast, the number of follow-on Me Too SNDS and 
First in Class SNDS NOCs increased significantly.  Me Too SNDS 
NOCs in particular doubled over the test period.  Moreover, First in 
Class SNDS NOCs increased in a strongly time-dependent manner, 
 
18. For a comparison of Canadian and WHO First in Class and Me Too classifications 
schemes, see Sawicka and Bouchard, supra note 11, at 108.  “[U]nder the WHO methodology, 
compounds that are in the same chemical family as the original First in Class drug are all 
deemed to be Me Too drugs irrespective of whether they are directed to the new indications.”  
Id.  
80 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 15:1 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
0
5
10
15
20
Year
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
0
45
90
135
180
Year
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
0
45
90
135
180
Year
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
a
c
b
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
A
pp
ro
va
ls
 (N
o.
)
from a single drug in 2001 to twenty-two drugs in 2008.  The slope of this 
increase over time well exceeds even that for generic supplemental 
submissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.  Shifting Patterns of Drug Approval and Drug Regulation During the Period 2001–2008.  a. 
Market authorizations for several types of follow-on drugs increased over the 2001–2008 test 
period.  This includes, brand-name Supplemental New Drug Submission (SNDS;  ) and SNDS 
First In Class (SNDS FIC;?) approvals, and generic Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS; 
?) and follow-on Abbreviated New Drug Submission (SANDS; ?) approvals.  b. In contrast, 
approvals granted to brand-name firms for “new” drug submissions declined from a smaller 
baseline over the same period.  This included approvals from New Drug Submission (NDS; ?), 
New Active Substance (NAS; ?) and NDS First In Class (NDS FIC; ?) streams.  c. Expedited 
review pathway for drug approval is shifting towards probationary-type approval consistent with 
emerging lifecycle models of regulation.  Expedited drug approvals with no post-market 
evidentiary obligations (Priority Review; ?) decreased over the 2001–2008 test period while those 
with significant post-market obligations conditions (NOC/c; ?) increased steeply over the same 
time frame.  Reproduced courtesy of the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.© 
Together with data showing a decline in all types of new or standard 
submissions by brand-name firms and an increase in other types of 
supplementary submissions assessed, these results suggest that the 
Canadian pharmaceutical industry is expending increasingly fewer of its 
resources on developing novel “first-of-kind” technologies, more on 
leveraging existing technologies. As such, technology appropriation is 
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alive and well in Canada.19 
The data from Study 1 suggest that the trend toward the “flexible 
departure” limb of the emerging lifecycle model of drug regulation is 
being accompanied by a small but significant trend for sponsors to meet 
conditions associated with NOC/c approval (Fig. 3).  This conclusion is 
tempered, however, by the large number of outstanding NOC/c approvals 
where the conditions have not yet been met.  A second caveat is the fact 
that there is not a great deal of data in this regard, given the gap between 
issuance and conditions met in later years, which does not apply to 
analysis of approvals per se.  The observation that an increasing number 
of drugs are being made available to the public under the circumstance 
that they meet certain conditions in order to maintain market 
authorization demonstrates that Health Canada is already approving 
drugs with the Progressive Licensing Framework (PLF) in mind.  
Positively, to date none of these drugs have been recalled for safety 
reasons.  
The second limb of Study 1 focused on the innovative character of 
approvals granted between 2001 and 2008.20  As with the initial study, 
our goal was to develop an independent method to quantify patterns in 
innovative activity by pharmaceutical firms and to analyze this data in 
relation to regulatory incentives designed to encourage pharmaceutical 
innovation via provision of strong patent rights.  The work was 
specifically designed to probe the functional and structural link between 
drug approval, drug patenting, drug litigation, and innovation.  
 
 
19. As used here, the term “appropriation” refers to a party’s ability to capture profits 
generated from their own inventions or related inventions.  See generally David J. Teece, 
Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, 
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986). 
20. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14. 
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Fig. 3.  Profile of Pharmaceutical Innovation in Canada between 2001–2008. a. New v. follow-on 
approvals.  Of total drugs approved over the test period, 15% constituted New Drug Submissions 
(NDS: ?) while 84% were for follow-on drugs (SNDS, ANDS and SANDS: ?).  b. Types of 
follow-on approvals.  Of follow-on approvals, 6.1% were for supplementary “First in Class” (SNDS 
FIC: ?) drugs while 59% were for Me-Too drugs (?).  c. Brand name v. Generic approvals.  Of all 
drugs approved during the test period, 65.5% of approvals were granted to brand name drug 
companies (NDS and SNDS:  ) and 34.5% to generic companies (ANDS and SANDS: ?).  d. Most 
innovative drugs.  While 6.5% of approvals during the test period were directed to New Active 
Substances (?; NAS) and 5.3% of all NDS and SNDS submissions were approved under an 
expedited review process (?; Priority Review and NOC/c), only 1.23% of all drugs approved over 
the period 2001–2008 were also directed to FIC therapies and contained a NAS (?).  Areas are 
approximations of calculated means for the entire test period.  Note that area scales are linear for 
panels a-c and log for panel d.  Reproduced courtesy of the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.©  
 
The data revealed that the number of truly innovative drug products 
was very small, amounting to just 1.87% of all approvals granted to 
brand-name drug companies over the eight-year test period.  The largest 
fraction of drug development was directed to Me Too drugs (59%), 
while follow-on drugs as a whole represented 85% of all approvals over 
the test period.  By contrast, the percentage of approvals that either 
contained an NAS that was directed to a First in Class drug, even 
irrespective of whether First in Class drugs were approved via the new 
(NDS) or follow-on (SNDS) approval pathways, or that underwent 
some form of expedited review was only 6.5%, 6.4%, and 5.3% of all 
approvals granted between 2001 and 2008, respectively.  The largest 
category for new drugs assessed was for NDS approvals, and even then 
2011] I’M STILL YOUR BABY 83 
 
only 16% of all approvals went through this mechanism; the remaining 
drugs were approved via SNDS and generic pathways.  The data 
illustrate that drug companies are focusing their efforts primarily on 
follow-on drug development, and that this effort was rewarded by 
Canadian regulators with large numbers of approvals directed to these 
products.  
Our qualitative findings on pharmaceutical innovation in Canada parallel 
those observed in other jurisdictions, including the United States.21  That is, 
the multinational pharmaceutical industry appears to be leaning away from 
breakthrough drug development, towards less innovative products referred to 
variously as follow-on, incremental, supplemental, line extension, Me Too, 
and bioequivalent drugs.  While our data do not speak directly to claims that 
diminished innovation is due to the loss of “low hanging fruit”22 or spiraling 
costs of drug development,23 we argue the results provide a third plausible 
explanation for the diminution of breakthrough product development.  That is, 
innovation policy and drug regulation that are strongly dependent on 
intellectual property rights can profoundly shape the rate and direction of 
innovative activity by multinational firms antecedently, towards incentives 
provided for by law and away from truly breakthrough products under 
conditions where the two do not coincide. 
B.  Study 2* 
In our second study (“Study 2”),24 we set out to empirically analyze 
 
21. See, e.g., John Abraham & Courtney Davis, A Comparative Analysis of Drug Safety 
Withdrawals in the UK and the US (1971–1992): Implications for Current Regulatory Thinking 
and Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2005); Editorial, European and French Pharmaceutical 
Market Assessed by Prescrire in 2005: Mainly Bogus Innovation, 30 FARMACIA 
HOSPITALARIA 68 n.2 (2006) [hereinafter Bogus Innovation];  Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., 
Therapeutic Ratings and End-of-Phase II Conferences: Initiatives To Accelerate the 
Availability of Important New Drugs, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 17 (1991); Domenico 
Motola et al., An Update on the First Decade of the European Centralized Procedure: How 
Many Innovative Drugs?, 62 BRIT. J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 610 n.5 (2006); Drugs 
in 2001: A Number of Ruses Unveiled, 11 PRESCRIRE INT’L 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Drugs 
in 2001]; NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PATTERNS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 7–14 (2002) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION]; New Medicines in 2007: Regulatory Agencies and Policy Makers Leave Public 
Health in the Hands of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 17 PRESCRIRE INT’L 78 n.94 (2008) 
[hereinafter New Medicines in 2007].  
22. Fredric J. Cohen, Opinion, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE 
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY, Jan. 2005, at 78 [hereinafter Cohen 2005]. 
23. Joseph DiMassi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 152 (2003). 
* For the full study, please refer to Ron A. Bouchard, Richard W. Hawkins, Robert Clark, 
Ray Hagtvedt, & Jamil Sawani, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval–Drug Patenting 
Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 174 (2010).  
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drug patenting patterns for high value drug candidates.  We investigated 
patenting and listing data associated with ninety-five drugs approved 
between 2001 and 2008.  Data were analyzed with regard to five 
categories: (1) the entire cohort of drugs (Cohort; n=95), (2) the most 
profitable drugs by sales (Most Profitable; n=33), (3) the drugs 
approved via an expedited approval process without significant post-
market conditions (Priority Review; n=40), (4) the drugs approved via 
expedited approval with significant post-market conditions (NOC/c; 
n=16), and (5) the drugs approved via the Priority Review stream that 
were also approved with significant post-market conditions (PR-NOC/c; 
n=6).  Drugs were, therefore, split into categories representing drugs 
already vetted by the market to be blockbuster in nature, and those that 
were granted expedited review status by regulators in the hopes they 
would be blockbusters.  For the sake of simplicity, only results 
pertaining to the cohort are presented here.  
The cohort was associated with 3,850 patents, resulting in a large 
average patent per drug ratio of 40:1.  In other words, each drug studied 
was associated with at least 40 patents.  Of these, 196 (5%) were listed 
on the patent register to prevent generic entry under the NOC 
Regulations.  Patenting activity per drug took place over a relatively 
long period of thirty-five years.  The time required for peak patenting 
per drug progressively declined over the course of 1977 to 2000, from 
about twenty-five years to eight years.  Averaged patenting activity, 
expressed as year after first instance, exhibited a significant plateau over 
an eight year period, between eight and sixteen years after the year of 
first instance.  During this time, peak patenting was maintained at an 
average of about 2.5 patents per drug per year.  
Statistical fits to the data suggest there were two components of 
pharmaceutical patenting in between 1977 and 2001; a slower and 
smaller amplitude component up to 1993 and a larger and faster 
component following 1993.  As illustrated by the data in Fig. 4, the 
amount of patenting was approximately 2.5 times greater and 2.0 times 
faster between 1993 and 2001 than patenting patterns from 1977 to 1993.  
Given that the break in patenting activity in 1993 coincides with the 
coming into force of the NOC Regulations, the results strongly suggest 
that the linkage regime itself has substantially influenced both the 
degree and rate of patenting activity by brand-name pharmaceutical 
firms. 
 
 
24. See Bouchard 2010, supra note 13. 
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Fig 4.  Fit of Cohort Patenting Data to Exponential Functions.  Data were fit to two single 
exponential functions using two different procedures.  In panel a, data were split into two epochs; 
1977–1993 (?) and 1993–2001 (?), the point of maximal rate of increase in patenting activity.  Data 
were then fit to a sum of two single exponential 4 parameter functions of the form A•exp(b•(Y-
d))+B, where A is amplitude, B is the rate constant of the exponential function and Y is calendar 
year.  Solid and dashed lines are fits to epochs one and two, respectively.  Amplitudes and time 
constants were 12.60 0.1467 and 30.24 and 0.2875 for the first and second epochs respectively.  The 
fits suggest the presence of a small and slower phase of patenting followed by a larger and faster 
phase.  In panel b, linear regression analysis was undertaken to probe whether a year-specific 
change in the patent regime in 1993 resulted in a second exponential function.  We assumed a data 
generating process with the functional form: Y= •exp[( 0+ 1 I)t+ ], where Y is total patents,  is a 
noise term with zero mean and constant variance, t is the year, and I is an indicator variable taking 
on the value 1 for year 1993 and later, and zero otherwise.  A log transform allowed testing of the 
null hypothesis ( 1= 0) using linear regression.  The result (p=0.006955) suggests there is a shift in 
the exponential growth of patenting in 1993.  Raw data (?) are the same as those in a. Reproduced 
courtesy of the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property.©  
 
We next investigated changes in global patterns of peak patenting 
per drug for the cohort.  We analyzed changes in the average time it 
took for peak patenting per drug over the course of the period 1977–
2000 for the 95 drugs in the cohort.  Data are expressed as the time after 
the year of first issuance of a patent for a given drug.  This was done to 
probe the patenting strategy of pharmaceutical firms over the test 
period.   
During the first four years of the test period (1977–1980) the average 
year to peak patenting activity was about twenty-five years.  For the five 
years between 1986 and 1991, this value decreased to about fifteen 
years, and decreased further again to eight years for the five-year period 
a
b
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between 1996 and 2000.  Thus, there was a reduction of the time to peak 
patenting from a maximum of twenty-five years in 1979 to a minimum of 
7.5 years in 2000.  This equals a 70% increase in the speed of maximal 
patenting per drug over the course of twenty years.  While this 
conclusion is somewhat tentative given the lower numbers of patents 
towards the end of the test period, the data suggest that pharmaceutical 
firms have become significantly more efficient in their patenting efforts 
over time.  This conclusion is supported by the substantial growth in 
patent listing in the last decade, the convergence of patenting and patent 
listing data, and the decreasing time lag between drug approval and 
drug patenting and patent listing. 
Data in Study 2 were also analyzed within the context of patent type 
(chemical, use, etc.) and therapeutic (cardiovascular, antibiotic, etc.) 
classification schemes, the former of which was developed for this study.  
Patent classifications were calculated based on whether patent claims 
were directed to given content.  The results demonstrate significant 
preferences in the various groups towards discrete therapeutic and 
patent classifications.  Indeed, the cohort was associated with a vast 
array of both patent and WHO therapeutic classifications.  There were 
5,859 individual patent classifications on the cohort, which amounted to 
an average of 61 patent classes per marketed drug.  These were 
distributed widely across patent types, with particular concentrations for 
Combination Therapy, Use and Administration patents, and a second 
large grouping for Chemical and Process patents.  The results on 
therapeutic classifications indicated a relatively narrow scope of 
therapeutic targets, with strong overlap between therapeutic classes 
identified in the study and those with the highest domestic sales in 
Canada.  
Results from the patent classification study are particularly relevant 
to analysis of the validity of the NOC Regulations.  Readers may be 
reminded that the two main regulatory mechanisms underpinning 
follow-on innovations are the wide definition of a NAS and the wide 
scope of uses and chemical derivatives permitted under the SNDS 
stream.  For example, a NAS may include isomers, derivatives, or salts 
of chemical substances already approved for sale or biological 
substances previously approved but differing in molecular structure, 
nature of the source material, or even manufacturing process.25  
 
25. Memorandum from E. Somers on New Active Substances to Health Canada (June 
4, 1991), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nas_nsa_pol-eng.pdf [hereinafter Health Canada, New Active 
Substances]; Health Canada, Notice of Compliance (NOC) Database Terminology (Oct. 1 
2004), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/notices-avis/noc-acc/term_noc_acc-
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Similarly, an SNDS may be filed for changes to a drug that is already 
marketed by a sponsor: including minor changes to dosage, strength, 
formulation, manufacture, labeling, route of administration, or 
use/indication.  
Either of these two approval pathways would be consistent with 
what we have termed a “paradoxical approval-patent linkage,” whereby 
pharmaceutical firms game the linkage system in order to obtain the 
largest patent protection under the NOC Regulations for the products 
with the lowest levels of innovation.  The patent classification data 
observed here show that the patent pool supporting submissions 
directed to the SNDS approval stream is very large, as is the pool for 
other approval types with narrow filing requirements (NAS, NOC/c, 
Priority Review; SNDS First in Class).  Similarly, the therapeutic 
classification data indicate that firms are innovating in relatively low-
risk areas with established market presence.  In addition to supporting 
follow-on drug submissions, a wide array of patent classifications, 
particularly for combination, use and chemical derivative patents, would 
also provide fodder for listing on the patent register.  A broad array of 
patents can increase the market exclusivity period of blockbuster drugs 
about to come off patent by either providing for further related follow-
on drug submissions, or increasing the pool of “relevant” patents for 
listing on the patent register. 
Combined, the data in Study 2 demonstrate that firms are able to 
identify attractive drug candidates both after regulatory approval and 
during the approval process.  During the approval stage, firms begin the 
process of layering patents, listing patents on the patent register, and 
obtaining further patents with broad classifications to expand the 
boundary of legal protection afforded by the patent and linkage 
regulation regimes.  Broad patent classification in particular allows firms 
to fill offers with candidates for later follow-on submissions and patent 
listing candidates.  
A final observation from Study 2 is that the linkage regime, acting in 
combination with both the traditional patent system and the existing 
drug approval framework, has proven to be a highly flexible tool in the 
hands of sophisticated pharmaceutical firms.  For example, the 
combination of the speed of patent listing compared with patenting and 
the relatively low relevance requirement for listing has enabled 
pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug targets for legal 
protection even during the regulatory approval stage, particularly for 
drugs undergoing some form of expedited approval.  
 
eng.php.  
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Identification of drugs for “rights layering” early in the approval 
stage rather than later further serves the significant function of reducing 
the regulatory lag at the front end of the product lifecycle while at the 
same time extending market exclusivity at the end of a product lifecycle.  
Together, the results from Study 2 show strong, increasing, and faster 
utilization of both patent and linkage regulation regimes for high value 
pharmaceuticals over time, particularly for drugs undergoing some form 
of expedited approval. 
C.  Study 3* 
Our third study (“Study 3”)26 was focused on the functional linkage 
between approved drugs and extended patent protection afforded by 
the NOC Regulations in a subgroup of the most profitable drugs in 
Canada (n=16).  We chose the top sixteen drugs for our initial study 
because this cohort was likely to display the strongest patenting and 
patent listing patterns.  Pharmaceutical companies have a vested interest 
to protect the market on their most profitable drugs, and the primary 
means of doing so is via patenting.  Each of the drugs studied under the 
patent analysis were approved between 2001 and 2008 and were 
analyzed as part of Study 1.  
 
 
* Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W. 
Hawkins. The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading 
Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009). 
26. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14. 
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Fig 5.  Patenting and Patent Listing Patterns Associated with Drug Approval.  a. Total patents 
issued by year associated with a subset of sixteen top selling drugs (?); cumulative  number of 
patents associated with the subset (?); and cumulative number of patents listed on the patent 
register under linkage regulations associated with the subset (?).  Note the strong convergence of 
total and listed patents over the course of the test period.  b. Total (?) and average (?) number of 
patents on approved drugs within the subset plotted as a function of the time after the priority date 
on which the first patent on the subset was issued.  c. Method used to calculate the temporal gap 
between the date of mean drug approval on the patent subset (2005) and the inflection point (IP), 
50th and 100th percentile of normalized maximum drug patenting and approvals.  Data are from 
the cumulative number of patents (?) above.  d. Graph expressing the temporal relationship 
between drug approval and the IP, 50th and 100th percentile of maximal normalized patents 
granted per year (PY), cumulative patents per year (CPY), and cumulative patents listed on the 
patent register per year (CPRY).  Time points are calculated as the difference between the date of 
drug approval (NOC) and the date of the IP, 50th and 100th percentile (NOC-x).  The data suggest 
drug patent listing is a better proxy for drug approval than drug patenting.  Reproduced courtesy of 
the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.©
   
Patents granted on the approval subset had a bell-shaped 
distribution over time, peaking in 2001.  There were a total of 772 
patents on the 16 drug products.  As illustrated in Fig. 5a, this 
corresponded to an average patent per product ratio of 48:1.  That is, 
there was an average of 48 patents for each drug in the subset analyzed.  
The fastest rate of grant occurred between approximately 1993 and 
2001.  Patenting reached a plateau by 2004.  When expressed as year 
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after first instance (Fig. 5b), patenting grants can be seen to occur over a 
twenty-five year period on average.  Listing data is also provided in Fig. 
5a.  As expected, it lags behind patenting activity.  However, listing 
activity catches up quickly, as indicated by the convergence of the two 
curves over time. 
Study 3 also investigated the temporal relationship between NOC 
grants, patent issue, and patent listing in some detail.  We found there 
was a significant lag between the date on which NOCs were granted and 
the dates on which patents of the same drug product were granted.  This 
pattern was observed independent of whether patents were expressed 
by year of grant or cumulatively.  This is not surprising in light of the 
regulatory lag between drug patenting and drug approval.  However, the 
data were different for patent listings.  As shown in Fig. 5d, the average 
data for both the inflection point (the point at which the data 
significantly depart from baseline) and the fiftieth percentile of 
maximum exceeded the null point by only four and two years, 
respectively.  This lag can be compared with that of ten and eight years 
for patenting data.  Of interest, the calculated values for the fiftieth 
percentile and peak patent listing were only one to two years on either 
side of the null point.  In other words, there was virtually no significant 
lag between drug approval and patent listing as the test period 
progressed from 2001 to 2008.  
Data from the analysis described above suggest that patent listing 
under the NOC Regulations appears to have evolved over time to be a 
better proxy for drug development than drug patenting per se.  This 
result suggests that while patenting data remains an important reflection 
of innovation incentives for domestic pharmaceutical companies, patent 
listing may have evolved into a more contextually relevant indicator of 
drug development in Canada. 
While the idea that patent listing may better reflect firm drug 
development strategy under pharmaceutical linkage, this analysis does 
not reflect on trends for new and follow-on drugs specifically.  We 
therefore further explored the link between the timing of new and 
follow-on drug approvals, expedited drug approvals, and associated 
drug patenting, patent listing and litigation.  In this analysis, drug 
patenting and listing were assumed to represent incentives for 
innovation whereas expedited drug approval was taken as a measure of 
lifecycle-based regulatory incentives for innovation.  In particular, we 
compared fitted curves for cumulative patenting and patent listing 
activity as well as that for expedited approval against concomitant fits to 
new and follow-on drug approvals.  The data indicated that neither the 
steep time-dependent changes in patent grant, patent listing, nor 
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NOC/c-type approval (expedited approval with significant post-
marketing evidentiary requirements) were correlated with, and thus, 
may not provide a measurable incentive for, pioneering drug 
development.  Patenting, patent listing, and NOC/c approvals were all 
strongly non-linear in nature (i.e., occurring very rapidly) compared 
with the slow linear changes in both new and follow-on drug approvals.  
The three trends could be observed to occur either before or during 
those for new and follow-on drug development.  
The observations from the analysis above suggest that neither 
patenting, patent listing, nor emerging lifecycle-based models of drug 
regulation appear to have provided significant incentives for new drug 
development in Canada.  Results such as these support the conclusion 
that the NOC Regulations provide a stronger incentive for follow-on 
rather than pioneering drug development.  
One of the most important observations of Study 3 was that the 
linkage regime can, in the hands of sophisticated firms, essentially 
double the cumulative term of patent protection on drug products.  As 
demonstrated by the dark blue symbols and line in Fig. 6, the average 
period of patent protection associated with the “originating patent” was 
about twenty years, from 1983 to 2003.  This represents an average of 
patent terms before (seventeen years from date of grant) and after 
(twenty years from filing date) amendments made to patent legislation 
pursuant to TRIPS.  By comparison, the duration of cumulative 
protection on the subset of most profitable drugs was about two-fold 
longer, lasting from about 1987 to 2026.  This yields a term of extended 
patent protection, due solely to operation of linkage regulations, of 
about forty-three years per drug on average.  The primary basis for this 
extension is the cumulative life of patents deemed legally relevant to the 
original product that were listed on the patent register to prevent 
generic entry.  The averaged results from the sixteen drugs studied are 
shown in Fig. 6 below. 
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from the averaged data.  Litigation data on this drug revealed an 
astounding number of trials, motions, appeals, and decisions at the same 
level of court with differing results.  We identified eighty-two patents 
associated with two drug forms of Omeprazole, Losec® and Nexium,® 
that were granted over a period of twenty years.  The patents had a 
cumulative term of patent protection of close to fifty years.  The priority 
dates for the first and final patent were 1978 and 2005, respectively.  
Therefore, the period of hypothetical patent protection on the 
Omeprazole group ran from 1975 to about 2025.  In comparison, the 
first NOC for Omeprazole (Losec®) was granted on June 13, 1989, 
yielding a regulatory gap of close to ten years.  Of eighty-two patents 
that were deemed relevant to Omeprazole, 27% (n=22) were listed on 
the patent register. Compared to the average of 5% on the group, the 
data indicate that once the market vets a compound as “high value,” 
firms increase patent listing. 
At the completion of our analysis (December 31, 2008), there were 
61 separate trials on twenty-two listed patents, including 310 motions 
(mean=5.08 per trial) and twenty-five final trial decisions.  Of final 
decisions, fourteen went on to appeal at the Federal Court of Appeal 
and eight went on to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Litigation occurred 
over a term of sixteen years, essentially from the time the linkage 
regulations came into force in 1993 until the present.  Four trials on 
twelve patents are currently ongoing.  The average date on which 
relevant trials ended, and thus, the date of “reactivation” of the average 
generic approval was December 2003.  
Under the terms of the NOC Regulations, litigation over patents 
relating to Losec® and Nexium® resulted in a delay of market entry of 
close to three (2.83) years for the group.  According to IMS Health,27 
sales of the two drugs in drugstores and hospitals over the same time 
frame were CN $1.4 billion.  In comparison, total spending on 
prescription pharmaceuticals rose from CN $11.7 billion in 2001 to CN 
 
27. INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
SHAREHOLDERS (2003), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth; 
INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
SHAREHOLDERS (2002), http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/RX/reports/-
ar2002.pdf; INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
SHAREHOLDERS (2001), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth.  See 
also INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY REVIEW (2001) (on file with author); INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. 
HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY REVIEW (2002) (on file with 
author); INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY REVIEW (2003) (on file with author).  
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$17.97 billion in 2004,28 representing an increase of 92%.  This includes 
an increase in out-of-pocket consumer spending from CN $2.56 billion 
to CN $3.36 billion.  
Data pertaining to Ompeprazole and other blockbuster drugs 
subject to heavy litigation at the same time require updating, as 
amendments to linkage laws have been made over the last three to four 
years that have narrowed the scope of listed patents to those specific to 
a given submission and that prevent multiple automatic injunctions per 
reference product.  Having said this, our newer data provide multiple 
examples of similar “product clusters” enabled by linkage, a theory for 
which is explored in Section III.A. below.  It is reasonable to speculate 
however that “but for” the existence of the linkage regime that generic 
entry may have occurred closer to expiry of the originating patent or 
patents, as anticipated by the government prior to the NOC Regulations 
coming into force,29 with an accordingly shorter period of delayed entry.  
Either way, the linkage regime has proved to be a highly effective 
mechanism for extending market monopolies on profitable drugs. 
D.  Interpretation 
A linkage regime that provides patent protection on poorly 
innovative drugs that extends well beyond the term of originating 
patents, not only has the potential to debilitate the patent system in the 
short term, but also to weaken pharmaceutical innovation more 
generally in the long term.30  In the context of the linkage regime, the 
weak relevance requirement acts in combination with the automatic 
injunction and low evidentiary requirements for new and follow-on drug 
approval to yield a situation where the notion of patent protection can 
be taken to a point near its logical extreme.  The data reviewed above 
suggest that if linkage regimes provide fertile grounds for firms to 
compete at a lower level of innovation, they also discourage firms from 
innovating at a level of competition that would provide the greatest 
benefit to society.  This dilemma can be illustrated by a comparison of 
the data from Studies 1 and 3.  
On the one hand, it was demonstrated that a very small fraction of 
drugs approved by regulators over the eight-year test period could be 
 
28.  CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., DRUG EXPENDITURE IN CANADA, 1985 TO 2008, 
at 6, 60 (2009). 
29. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–40 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Minister Michael Wilson and 
Dr. Elizabeth Dickerson). 
30. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, 
Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, ¶ 37 (Can.). 
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considered truly breakthrough in nature based on several metrics.  This 
includes drugs approved via the NDS stream (16%), those containing a 
NAS (6.1%), total drugs (NDS and SNDS) directed to First in Class 
therapies (6.5%), those that underwent one of two pathways (priority 
review; NOC/c) for expedited review (5.3%), and those that met the 
most stringent requirements for breakthrough products (1.23%; 1.87% 
of brand-name approvals).  
On the other hand, the linkage study illustrated that patent 
protection under linkage regulations does not discriminate between 
poorly or strongly innovative drugs.  It arbitrarily offers to 
pharmaceutical firms broad and long-lasting intellectual property rights 
targets, regardless of the types of products being introduced into the 
marketplace.  This is a particularly relevant point for follow-on drug 
products, which are well recognized to entail lower risks and costs to 
pharmaceutical firms,31 yet which also are associated with an enhanced 
term of monopoly pricing.  As suggested by the data from Study 1, the 
evolution toward a lifecycle-based regulatory approach to drug approval 
will likely do little to affect the rate and direction of innovative activity 
by firms absent shifts in legal incentives for breakthrough and follow-on 
drug development. 
Discordance between the basket of patent rights incentives for 
innovation and resulting product development is further supported by 
data from Study 3.  For example, the close temporal relationship 
between drug approval and patent listing and the strong convergence of 
patent grants and patent listing following the coming into force of 
linkage regulations provides evidence for the conclusion that patent 
listing evolved into a more effective target, and thus, a better proxy, for 
drug approval than drug patenting per se once the linkage regime came 
into effect.  Other evidence for this conclusion comes from data showing 
that steep time-dependent changes in drug patenting, patent listing, and 
the evolution toward lifecycle regulation appeared to have occurred 
independently of concomitant trends for new and follow-on drug 
approvals. 
The outcome of this dynamic, supported by averaged data for 
sixteen drugs and the single example of Omeprazole, is that 
pharmaceutical firms can leverage government policy and regulation 
where given the opportunity to maintain market share for drugs coming 
off patent rather than developing new blockbuster drugs.  The results 
are not dissimilar to studies of complex political systems, where 
“yardsticks” designed to measure progress reorient behavior narrowly 
 
31. Cohen 2005, supra note 22, at 78. 
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towards fulfillment of yardstick metrics.32  
Our analysis of the drug approval-patenting linkage shows that new 
drug development has stagnated while follow-on drug development has 
flourished since the NOC Regulations came into force.  However, as 
illustrated by the results in Study 2, these trends have been accompanied 
by increasing and faster utilization of both established patent law and 
emerging linkage regulations by pharmaceutical firms.  Moreover, the 
large array of patent and therapeutic classifications indicated that firms 
are focused on expanding the ever-widening pool of patents for 
purposes of both follow-on drugs and for patent listing purposes.  The 
data also support a focus by firms on a “paradoxical drug approval-
patent linkage,” whereby firms receive the largest scope of intellectual 
property protection for the lowest level of innovation.  
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that in combination the 
existing framework for drug approval, the traditional patent system, and 
the emerging linkage paradigm has afforded the largest scope of 
intellectual property protection to pharmaceutical products in the 
history of Canada.  The implication of the results as a whole is that firms 
are aiming ex ante at legal targets that provide the most return on 
investment rather than innovative products providing the most benefit 
to the public. 
An important aspect of the work described above is that it provides 
objective evidence demonstrating that even though many follow-on 
drugs have little or no therapeutic value over existing products, they can 
nevertheless be used to powerfully extend market exclusivity for 
blockbuster drugs.  Patents on such products can be used for this 
purpose either by providing the basis for follow-on drug submissions or 
by providing a large pool for patenting listing purposes.  In either case, 
breakthrough innovation is diminished at the same time as the timely 
entry of generic products is delayed.   
Finally, empirical data such as those reviewed above have 
implications for innovation theory in general, which often posits that 
incremental or follow-on innovation is just as important to overall 
innovation as pioneering innovations.  Indeed, the pharmaceutical 
industry has been consistently heralded as the best example of the 
success of the patenting regime, almost in the complete absence of 
objective empirical data.33  In this regard, it is noteworthy that because 
 
32. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 
87 (1997) (noting that “the interactions in the system may alter the meaning of the 
yardstick.”). 
33. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 212. 
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of weak regulatory requirements for new and follow-on drug approval 
and for patent listing, follow-on drugs that may have little or no 
therapeutic benefit compared to existing drug products can be used to 
substantially extend market exclusivity on blockbuster drugs that do 
have significant benefits to the public at large.34  Thus, the social 
consequences of a regulatory preference for follow-on drugs may be 
greater in the public health sector than other sectors of the economy.  
This issue is explored more fully in Section III.A. below in terms of 
product clusters. 
II. ARE THE REGULATIONS A SUCCESS? 
This section of the Article provides a discussion of the performance 
of the linkage regime in light of the empirical data reported above and 
the stated policy goals underpinning the NOC Regulations to stimulate 
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitate timely 
market entry of generic drugs.  
One of the major promises made by the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry in the lead-up to both Bill C-22 and Bill C-91,35 supported by 
domestic universities, was to inject billions of dollars into domestic 
research and development activities.  This investment was specifically 
targeted towards the production of innovative therapeutic products.  
The Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, Michael Wilson, 
along with the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Michael 
Blais, both equated intellectual property rights with pharmaceutical 
innovation and hailed the new regime as the beginnings of a new, more 
innovative nation.36  Mr. Wilson went further, declaring that the 
injection of millions of dollars into domestic research and development 
would enable Canada to transition into “a world-class pharmaceutical 
industry. . . .”37  Claims of this nature were made at the same time as 
government was receiving evidence to the effect that amendments to its 
domestic patent laws would chill generic competition, cost Canadian 
consumers between CN $4 and $7 billion over a fifteen-year period,38 
and that the CN $500 million in research and development investment 
 
34. See infra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of the 
therapeutic value of follow-on drugs. 
35. Harrison, supra note 4, at 491. 
36. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:39–42 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
37. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:30 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
38. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68–92 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
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by multinational firms was actually composed in large part of substantial 
tax incentives ranging from 50% to 70%, depending on the province.39  
Experience since the dates on which pharmaceutical linkage came 
into force in the United States and Canada has shown that the legal 
definitions of “research” and “development” costs are very 
controversial,40 with industry critics claiming that marketing, advertising, 
opportunity and other related costs are in fact driving this line item.41  
There is ample evidence demonstrating that the pharmaceutical industry 
will take whatever steps necessary to protect what it sees as confidential 
 
39. For a review of the evidence in front of the House of Commons in the context of 
Bills C-22 and C-91, see Harrison, supra note 4, at 511–524 and Jordan, supra note 3.  In the 
Parliamentary debate leading up to enactment of Bill C-91, it was widely noted by several 
Members of Parliament that the CN $300–500 million figure had to be reduced in accordance 
with provincial tax incentives, which amounted to fifty-five, sixty, and seventy cents on the 
dollar in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, respectively, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of 
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:14, 4:39 (Nov. 27, 1992) 
and id. at 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:38, 5:40, 5:91 (Nov. 30, 1992).  During cross-
examination, federal employees acknowledged that these figures were correct and that the 
calculations were intentionally left out of government reports on topic leading to the 
hearings.  Id. at 34:6 Parliament of Canada 6:10 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
40. For a detailed history of litigation over public disclosure of pharmaceutical R&D 
costs, see generally U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: 
COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS  284•88 (1993) [hereinafter OFF. OF TECH ASSESSMENT].  
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the seminal Bowsher v. Merck Co. decision, held that 
pharmaceutical R&D and related costs, constituted confidential information and, thus, that 
the federal government did not have the authority to compel disclosure of such information.  
460 U.S. 824, 843 (1983).  For a more recent discussion of pharmaceutical R&D costs see U.S. 
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH RESPONSE TO CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR PLAN 
TO ENSURE TAXPAYER’S INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED (2001), available at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm.  In Canada, data submitted by pharmaceutical 
companies are deemed to be “commercially sensitive” and as such constitute confidential 
information under the Federal Access to Information Act.  See R.S.C., 1985 c. A-1 20(6).  
Under Section 20(6), disclosure can only be made where it is in the public interest and relates 
to public health and safety.  Id.  Health Canada will not, however, release information where 
public interest in disclosure is outweighed by financial loss or prejudice to the competitive 
position of the disclosing party.  Id.  See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1711; TRIPS, supra 
note 2, at art. 39 (pertaining to data and market exclusivity, which deem commercially 
sensitive information to be confidential).  See generally Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement, 138 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3712 n.50 (2004). (Regulations Amending the Food and Drug 
Regulations [1390 - Data Protection]), as modified by Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, 
140 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 1598 n.24 (2006) (Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations 
(Data Protection)). 
41. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:12, 4:20 (Nov. 27, 1992) (testimony of the Canadian Medical 
Association) and id. at 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7A:51 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony from 
Green Shield).  For a discussion of the role of marketing generally in Canada, see Trudo 
Lemmens & Ron A. Bouchard, Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada, CANADIAN 
HEALTH L. AND POL’Y 311, 312 (3d ed. 2007). 
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information relating to research and development expenditures,42 even 
when the U.S. Government Accountability Office is doing the asking.43  
In light of uncertainties as to how much financial support foreign firms 
have, in fact, provided to domestic research and development activities, 
the remaining discussion focuses on the data we do have in hand; that is, 
whether drugs approved following enactment of the NOC Regulations 
constitute new or follow-on drugs and the degree to which the legal link 
between drug approval and drug patenting under the NOC Regulations 
has provided for extended intellectual property protection that would 
not have occurred ‘but for’ operation of the linkage regime.  
The following section provides a brief historical overview of portions 
of the debate leading up to the enactment of the linkage regime, 
discussion of the original policy intent underpinning the regulations 
according to the federal government, a review of selected Supreme 
Court of Canada jurisprudence and principles of statutory interpretation 
that may be instructive when interpreting the broad purpose of the 
linkage regime, and finally, a reinterpretation of the empirical data in 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 based on the above material. 
A.  Debate Preceding Bill C-91 
As well described in the literature and case law, compulsory 
licensing of pharmaceuticals was introduced in Canada in 1923 and 
expanded yet again in 1969 to control increasing drug costs.  In 1987, 
amendments to the Patent Act in the form of Bill C-22 limited 
compulsory licensing and created the Patented Medicine Prices Review 
Board (PMPRB) to ensure that the prices of patented pharmaceuticals 
were not excessive.  The second, and more major, round of reforms 
came in 1993, at which time Bill C-9144 eliminated compulsory licensing, 
harmonized patent protection of pharmaceuticals in Canada with other 
developed nations, and enacted the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations.  Not surprisingly, many of the issues subject 
to intense criticism and judicial review since then were raised in the 
limited period of examination of Bill C-91, during the end of the 34th 
Session of Parliament in December 1992.  These issues include: the 
impact of the bill on drug costs, domestic research and development 
investments, patent terms, job creation, and the trickle-down effects of 
 
42. Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and 
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(1980); Jeffery M. Drazen, Who Owns the Data in a Clinical Trial?, 8 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 407 
(2002). 
43. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 40.  
44. The Patent Act Amendment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 2 (Can.). 
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increased public health costs.  However, with one major exception, the 
debate was characterized by a significant lack of foresight about the 
extent to which the reforms would impact patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals and the regulatory mechanisms through which this 
change would be effected. 
One of the primary points of contention in the Bill C-91 debate was 
investment of money by foreign multinationals into domestic research 
and development activities and the translation of this support into new 
and innovative products.  The Minister of Industry, Science and 
Technology, the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, and 
almost all of the major provincial universities equated increased 
intellectual property protection with increased research, increased 
innovation, and increased national productivity.45  In particular, 
extended patent rights were seen as the gateway to enhanced 
production of new and innovative technologies that could compete 
globally.  Support of expanded patent protection by industry and 
government sectors is well known.  Less known, however, was the role 
of the Canadian university system in this process.  University advocates, 
including those with clear conflicts of interest, claimed that industry 
profits resulting from enhanced patent protection would create a better 
society for Canadians.46  It was simply assumed by university advocates 
that increased intellectual property protection was positively related to 
increased innovation and increased therapeutic benefit to the public. 
This sentiment was not unanimous among Legislative Committee 
members or witnesses appearing before the Committee.  In particular, 
the Committee heard evidence from at least two major reports to the 
contrary that bear further scrutiny.  A 1981 OECD study47 noted that 
when governments with historically low levels of pharmaceutical 
 
45. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:8, 5:114, 5:116 (Nov. 30, 1992) and id. at 34:8 Parliament of 
Canada, 8:24, 8:28 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Tyrell, UT, Group of 10, Minister Blais, and 
Minister Wilson). 
46. See, e.g., Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill 
C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:20 (Nov. 30, 1992) (testimony of Lorne Tyrrell, who 
himself was the recipient of substantial pharmaceutical funding, which helped to create a 
spin-out company from which he personally profited).  The notion that pharmaceutical funds 
were “vital” to the health of Canadian universities was supported by testimony from other 
university administrators, including the so-called “group of 10.”  See, e.g., id. at 34:5 
Parliament of Canada, 5:116. 
47. M.L. Burstall, J.H. Dunning, & A. Lake, Multinational Enterprises, Governments 
and Technology—the Pharmaceutical Industry, (Paris: OECD, 1981) (cited in the Canadian 
Health Coalition and Medical Reform Group Brief, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of 
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:73, A5:83 (Nov. 30, 
1992)). 
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research and development try to stimulate it through policy levers such 
as patent rights, the results have been disappointing.  The Eastman 
Commission48 similarly noted that Canada lacks the fundamental 
resources to be a global force in pharmaceutical research and 
development.  The Commission went further, stating that providing 
multinational firms with enhanced domestic patent rights would not 
increase domestic innovation, given long established research and 
development centers elsewhere.49  As argued by one Committee 
member,50 conclusions such as those of Eastman and the OECD were 
consistent with data from a federal study showing Bill C-22 had minimal 
impact on university research and development activity.  Nevertheless, 
the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Harvie Andre, in the 
lead up to Bill C-22, and Michael Wilson, the Minister of Industry, 
Science and Technology at the time Bill C-91 was debated, continued to 
assert that increased patent rights would enable Canada to innovate on 
a “world scale” and to develop a “world-class pharmaceutical 
industry . . .”51  
A point that resonates particularly well with the data reported in 
Study 1 also was raised by the Canadian Association of Consumers 
(CAC).  The CAC expressed concern that patent reforms providing 
greater protection for Me Too and Line Extension drugs would come at 
the cost of truly innovative drugs and innovative health research 
generally.  Citing the Eastman report, the CAC noted that patent rights 
are not inalienable and are granted by governments cautiously with the 
specific purpose of stimulating an “appropriate amount of innovation.”52  
However, the issue of including definitions of the desired level of 
 
48. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY. (Supply and Services Canada 1985) (cited in Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:12 (Nov. 30, 
1992)). 
49. This point was also raised by the Canadian Consumer Protection Agency in its 
submissions (cited in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on 
Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:41 (Nov. 30, 1992)). 
50. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:12 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Testimony of Mr. MacDonald (Dartmouth) 
(citing a Canadian Industry, Science and Technology Report, entitled “Impact of 
Pharmaceutical Company Sponsored Research on Basic Research in Canadian 
Universities.”)). 
51. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:30 (Dec. 1, 1992) (Testimony of Minister Wilson); Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of 
Canada, 5A:73, 5A:81 (Nov. 30, 1992) (CHC Brief).  
52. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:60, 5A:19, 5A:20, 5A:30 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Association 
of Consumers, submissions and brief). 
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innovation resulting from increased patent rights or even evidence-
based output metrics for research and development investments was not 
taken up by many in the debate despite repeated calls for such outcomes 
by some participants in the hearings.53  
Insightful comments were also made by the CAC on the potential 
ramifications of extended patent protection for the development of new 
and innovative drugs.54  Milton Friedman was cited to the effect that 
patent monopolies too often provide strong incentives to shift research 
and development towards products like Me Too drugs where patents 
are more easily granted.  The key observation being that, as with patents 
granted by the Patent & Trademark Office,55 drug regulators are in the 
routine and predictable habit of granting approvals on products with 
low innovative value.  As used here, the phrase “low innovative value” 
refers to follow-on drugs that have little or no therapeutic benefit over 
existing marketed drugs.  
Indeed, the Committee heard evidence from an Industry, Science 
and Technology study before the Committee56 that indicated that 80% 
of clinical practitioners deemed domestic research and development to 
be in service of Me Too drugs.  This observation accords with our data 
 
53. Both the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and Canadian Association of 
Consumers (CAC) requested that the federal government take an “evidence-based” 
approach to assessing research and development costs and the impact of patent reforms on 
the costs and benefits of the public health system.  Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of 
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:53 (Nov. 30, 1992) 
(CAC); id. at 34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:8, 4A:18, 4:10 (Nov. 27, 1992) (CMA); Harrison, 
supra note 4, at 526 (concluding in his study of the political and economic factors 
underpinning Bill C-22 and Bill C-91 that “one cannot persuasively argue that the Mulroney 
administration tied or linked this costly policy (repeal of compulsory licensing) to any 
tangible benefit.”).  Indeed, during the debate over repeal of compulsory licensing and patent 
reforms in the lead up to TRIPS, NAFTA, and Bill C-22, proponents of increased patent 
protection were criticized for the lack of commitments by the pharmaceutical industry that 
would be “measureable and enforceable.”  Id.  The Minister of Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs at the time, Harvie Andre, replied that output metrics were not necessary, saying 
instead “[w]e prefer carrots to whips.  If it turns out that the donkey will not go with the 
carrot then maybe you will have to use the whip.”  Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of 
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-22, 33:2 Parliament of Canada, 1:11, 1545 (December 16, 
1982) (cited in Jordan, supra note 3, at 31–32). 
54. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:30 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
55. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1495 (2001). 
56. CHC Brief, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on 
Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:72, 5A:83 (Nov. 30, 1992). (citing K.M. Taylor, The 
Impact of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Clinical Research Programs on Medical Education, 
Practice and Researchers in Canada: a Discussion Paper, in CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FOUR SHORT-TERM STUDIES (Dept. of Industry, Science 
and Technology, Ottawa 1991)). 
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that nearly 60% of all drugs approved by Canadian regulators between 
2001 and 2008 were Me Too drugs.57  It is also consistent with statements 
made by the Medical Directors at Pfizer and Squibb that as much as 
75% of scientific research had been channeled into “copycat drugs and 
unimportant combinations.”58  Even Dr. Eastman, while providing 
testimony before the Committee as Chair of the PMPRB, acknowledged 
that there is little therapeutic benefit to be gained from Me Too and, 
particularly, Line Extension drugs.59  This statement accords with the 
results of later studies conducted in Canada, France, and the United 
States,60 including those in Studies 1, 2 and 3.  Finally, the Committee 
heard testimony about the “natural experiment” in Italy, where de novo 
institution of patent protections that were harmonious with those in the 
United States actually reduced national innovation and drove up the 
costs of drugs.61  Acknowledging room for debate in the interpretation 
of these studies, it is nevertheless clear that at the time the linkage 
regime came into force, there was significant evidence to suggest that 
increased patent rights would lead to neither enhanced innovation nor 
timely generic entry. 
In retrospect, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the debate 
leading up to the passage of Bill C-91 was that Section 4 of the Patent 
Act Amendment Act containing the linkage regulations was hardly 
debated at all, let alone noticed by most participants at the hearings.  
The original goal of the amendments was to allay concerns by brand-
name drug manufacturers that generic firms might use the provisions of 
the legislation allowing generics to seek regulatory approval without 
being subject to infringement (the so-called “early working” exception) 
to sell these products before the patent expired.  
Misunderstandings of the purpose, procedures, and even existence 
of the linkage regulations were widespread.  For example, the 
 
57. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14, at 1491.  
58. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:20 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
59. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:46 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
60. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, 24 
(2001); Bogus Innovation, supra note 21; Drugs in 2001, supra note 21; Kenneth I. Kaitin, 
supra note 21; Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace: Where Do We Go From Here?, 35 INT’L. J. HEALTH SERVS. 237, 243 (2005); 
Domenico Motola, supra note 21; PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra note 21 at 7; and 
New Medicines in 2007, supra note 21.  
61. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:134 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Health Coalition); id. at 34:7 
Parliament of Canada, 7:13 (members of Parliament) (Dec. 1, 1992). 
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Committee heard testimony that only sixteen drugs would be affected 
by the regulations.62  Several policy makers called as witnesses claimed 
they were not sure even why they were called to the proceedings,63 
stating on a number of occasions64 that they lacked the qualifications to 
comment on Bill C-91 even though they were responsible for drafting 
related policy documents based on which more senior officials were 
testifying.  Also common was the assertion that drugs that would be 
affected by the legislation were only associated with one patent, and 
thus, it was only one patent extension that generics had to contend with 
when waiting for market entry.  The most significant comments of this 
nature came from Dr. Elizabeth Dickson, Director General, Chemical 
and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology.  Dr. Dickson testified that, “I must explain that when a 
new medicine comes on the market there is a main patent.  When that 
main patent expires, anyone may copy that product and bring it to 
market.”65  
The general consensus at the hearings, included in testimony from 
the Canadian Health Collation,66 Dr. Dickson,67 and Michael Wilson, 
Minister of Industry, Science and Technology,68 was that patent reforms 
pursuant to Bill C-91 would increase market exclusivity for brand-name 
pharmaceuticals by only one to three years.  
The lone voice of dissent was Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a U.S. 
economist and pharmacologist who conducted an independent study on 
the potential impact of Bill C-91.  It is not surprising an American would 
bring the most experienced voice to the table.  Indeed, it is obvious from 
the language, concepts, and even the measurements he employed in his 
 
62. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:126 (Nov. 30, 1992) (comment made by a Vice President of 
Research from UBC).  
63. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:6 Parliament of Canada, 6:4 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Mr. David Blaker, Head, Risk Assessment 
and Management Section, Bureau of Drug Research, of National Health and Welfare). 
64. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:6 Parliament of Canada, 6:6–7, 6:9–11 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Mr. Blaker).  Another witness, Mr. 
Ross Duncan (Consumer Policy Branch, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs), 
testified that the only data he used to construct his report on the impact of Bill C-91 was data 
provided by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada (PMAC).  Id. at 6:12. 
65. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (emphasis added).   
66. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:76; 5:133 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
67. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:40 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
68. Id. 
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analysis that Dr. Schondelmeyer had several years of experience with 
the U.S. Hatch-Waxman linkage regime prior to giving testimony 
relating to Bill C-91.  In addition to predictions based on empirical data, 
the most important contribution made to the debate was introducing for 
the first time a focus on cumulative market exclusivity rather than on 
patent term per se: 
 
In fact, you may not realize that most pharmaceutical products 
have two, three, or even four patents that protect them, not just 
one patent.  They’ll have a patent on the chemical entity itself.  
There’ll be a patent on the dosage form.  There’ll be a patent on 
the use of the product in some cases, and sometimes a patent on 
the process by which the pharmaceutical is made.  So one can’t 
analyse [sic] the impact of this patent extension simply by looking 
at the extension of an individual patent.  What you have to analyse 
[sic] is the effect of the combination of those patents that are 
extended and how much that extends the total market exclusivity 
of a given pharmaceutical.69  
 
Based on his study, Dr. Schondelmeyer suggested that, in sharp 
contrast to the three years of market extension alluded to above, 33% of 
products affected by Bill C-91 would have increased market exclusivity 
by a term of ten years or more.70  Moreover, due to increasingly harmful 
effects on innovation, the short-term effects would be far less onerous 
than the long-term effects, with the worst impact on innovation and 
extended market exclusivity being seen about ten years after Bill C-91 
came into force.71  As discussed in more detail below, this is consistent 
with our data from Studies 1 and 3 showing steadily declining new drug 
development, steadily increasing follow-on innovation, steadily 
increasing patent protection over the last decade accompanied by 
increasing delays for generic entry.  As noted above, Dr. Dickson and 
Michael Wilson vigorously denied the importance of cumulative market 
exclusivity, maintaining that only one patent per drug prevented generic 
entry and that Bill C-91 would only increase exclusivity by a maximum 
of three years. 
 
69. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68 (Dec. 1, 1992) (emphasis added).  
70. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68, 7A:111 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
71. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:70 (Dec. 1, 1992).  (Professor Schondelmeyer assessed the net 
cumulative savings to Canadians (individual consumers, hospitals and insurance plans) from 
1993 to 2010 would be CN $7 billion in constant 1993 dollars).  
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In addition to the strength of the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby,72 trade 
harmonization efforts in the context of GATT73 and NAFTA,74 pressures 
from Quebec politicians and lobbyists,75 and concerns about incoming 
then-President-Elect Bill Clinton perhaps looking to a system of price 
control for pharmaceuticals not unlike that of the PMPRB,76 another 
reason for the patent reforms of Bill C-22 and C-91 was provided by the 
CAC.  In its testimony before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-
91,77 the group claimed that patent reforms such as those enshrined in 
Bill C-22 and Bill C-91 represented a naïve effort by the federal 
government to attract research and development funds in competition 
with other global jurisdictions with more established research and 
development bases that were using their patent systems and tax bases in 
the same way.  The CAC claimed that leveraging intellectual property 
strategy in this manner could not reasonably result in positive social 
welfare outcomes.  Rather, the more likely result was that reforms of 
this nature would induce a flow of capital to nations who have taxpayers 
with the deepest pockets.78  Instead of stimulating innovation, or even 
 
72. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:42 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(CCPA)).  The pharmaceutical industry was reportedly the second largest contributor to U.S. 
election campaign funding.  See, e.g., How Health PACs Spend Millions to Influence Elections, 
Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1989, at 14 (cited in 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7A:45 (Dec. 1, 
1992)). 
73. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:42 (Nov. 30, 1992) (CCPA).  
74. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:49 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
75. For a first-hand view, see all nine volumes of Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 
of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34 Parliament of Canada (1992).  For an arm’s 
length view, see generally Harrison, supra note 4; Tancer, supra note 4. 
76. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:73 (Nov. 30, 1992); id. at 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:18 
(Karpoff), 7:99 (Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association (CDMA)) (Dec. 1, 1992).  But 
see id. at 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (Minister Wilson, for a strong 
rebuttal of this argument).  For a historical discussion of why President Clinton might support 
price controls in the United States while seeking intellectual property privileges globally, see 
Harrison, supra note 4, at 461, 522, 523, 526.  
77. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:54–57 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
78. As a reminder, between fifty and seventy percent of the proposed sum of CN $500 
million that the pharmaceutical industry would invest in domestic research and development 
was composed of provincial tax breaks.  This is particularly relevant given testimony by Dr. 
Joel Lexchin before the C-91 Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the 
Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:135 (Nov. 30, 1992) that the 
majority of profits for provincial drug plans are due to savings from generic drugs.  In 
addition to provincial tax savings, Canada is known to have one of the more generous 
Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SRED) tax credit programs.  Id. 
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providing incentives for innovation, the net result is capital market 
protectionism by multinational pharmaceutical firms.  It is here where 
the “paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting linkage” described in our 
Northwestern study79 is particularly relevant, as the evidence we 
obtained suggests that firms may be strongly targeting their drug 
development efforts towards products with the greatest patent 
protection and the least amount of innovation.  
A related point, which accords well with later developed models of 
policy resistance80 and policy failure81 is the apparent failure of both 
legislators and policy-makers to at least anticipate some of the 
unintended consequences and feedback loops of rapidly pushing 
through widespread patent reforms based on a hitherto unexplored link 
between the goals and objects of industrial patent law with those of food 
and drug law: 
 
[A]s one involved in public policy, often the decisions we make 
quickly and without thorough evaluation are decisions that come 
back to haunt us.  Most legislation is precipitated by some critical 
event that has occurred.  We try to quickly develop legislation 
that responds to that critical event and then often find out after 
the fact that in addition to trying to solve the initial problem we 
have created a number of unintended consequences down the 
line that we have to go back and fix and correct.82 
B.  “Original Policy Intent” 
Often courts are left without clear guidance by government, either 
before or after legislation or regulations come into force.  Fortunately, 
the specific policy grounds underpinning the NOC Regulations have 
been articulated by the federal government in numerous government 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements (RIASs).83  The Supreme Court 
 
79. See supra Section III.  
80. See generally John D. Sterman, All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a 
Systems Scientist, 18 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 501 n.4 (2002). 
81. See generally Barry Bozeman & Daniel Sarewitz, Public Values and Public Failure 
in US [sic] Science Policy, 32 SCI. AND PUB. POL’Y 119 n.2 (2005); Barry Bozeman, Public-
Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 145, 145 (2002). 
82. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:92 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
83. Evidence of legislative intent regarding balancing patent enforcement and generic 
entry can be found in early RIAS documents.  See 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C. 
Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1588 (2008); Health Can., Health Prods. 
& Food Branch, Guidance Document, Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations (2010), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-
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of Canada has ruled that such documents constitute proper evidence of 
legislative intent, including in the context of litigation under the 
regulations.84  
According to a series of RIAS documents over a period of 
approximately ten years, the “original policy intent” in enacting the 
linkage regime was to balance patent enforcement over new and 
innovative drugs with the timely market entry of generic drugs.  The two 
pillars of the regulations were to increase production of new and 
innovative drugs while getting older drugs genericized as quickly as 
possible.  Importantly, the NOC Regulations were intended to operate 
in accordance with the established principles of patent law,85 and to 
further the “societal imperative” of developing new remedies to 
enhance public health.86  The specific linkage between the goals and 
objectives of food and drug law with those of patent law is said to 
reaffirm the “stability, predictability and competitiveness of Canada’s 
pharmaceutical patent regime”;87 a link vetted by multinational 
pharmaceutical firms themselves before and after the Canadian linkage 
 
ld/postnoc_change_apresac/noc_pn_framework_ac_sa_cadre-eng.pdf [hereinafter Health 
Canada Guidance].  An articulation of the government’s pharmaceutical policy as it relates to 
the NOC Regulations can be found in the June 17, 2006 RIAS, which states: 
The Government’s pharmaceutical patent policy seeks to balance effective patent 
enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of their 
lower-priced generic competitors. The current manner in which that balance is 
realized was established in 1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act 
Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2. 
140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1611 (2006).  See generally 132 C. Gaz. 11 Pt. I, 553 (1998); 133 C. Gaz. 21 
Pt. II, 2355 (1999).  Evidence of legislative intent regarding the “original policy intent” of 
encouraging development of new and innovative drugs can be found in both RIAS and 
related Guidance Document. 
84. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶¶ 47, 156, 
157 (Can.). Justice Binnie stated: 
It has long been established that the usage of admissible extrinsic sources regarding 
a provision’s legislative history and its context of enactment could be examined.  I 
held in Francis v. Baker, at para. 35, that “[p]roper statutory interpretation 
principles therefore require that all evidence of legislative intent be considered, 
provided that it is relevant and reliable.”  Consequently, in order to confirm the 
purpose of the impugned regulation, the intended application of an amendment to 
the regulation or the meaning of the legislative language, it is useful to examine the 
RIAS, prepared as part of the regulatory process . . . . 
Id. at ¶156.  See RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
STATUTES 499•500 (4th ed. 2002). 
85. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at ¶¶ 47, 156–157; AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada 
(Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 (Can.); ratiopharm inc. v. Wyeth and Wyeth 
Canada, [2007] F.C.A. 264 (Can.). 
86. 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004). 
87. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390 (2008). 
2011] I’M STILL YOUR BABY 109 
 
regime came into force.88  
In the United States, where pharmaceutical linkage first came into 
force, the purpose of Hatch-Waxman was explicitly to balance the two 
competing policy objectives of inducing brand pharmaceutical firms to 
make the investments necessary to develop new and innovative drug 
products while also enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic 
copies of those drugs to market as soon as possible.89  As noted by 
Senator Hatch at the time the legislation came into force said “The 
public receives the best of both worlds—cheaper drugs today and better 
drugs tomorrow.”90  Therefore, in addition to stimulating pioneering 
drug development, a second major policy goal of linkage in the Unites 
States was to facilitate timely generic entry.91  In its report on Hatch-
Waxman, the Committee on the Judiciary was explicit as to what public 
policy grounds were involved in achieving the balance of these 
competing policy goals, stating that early generic availability would 
substantially assist in the reduction of health care costs for the poor, the 
under-insured, elderly, and the government as a purchaser of 
prescription drugs.  In addition, and given the regulatory nature of the 
industry involved, early-working allowing a shortening of the delay of 
generic entry was held not to unduly encroach on the patent rights of 
brand firms and to properly enhance competition between brand and 
generic firms.92   
Hence the goal of linkage in both originating jurisdictions was to 
facilitate timely generic entry while also stimulating the development of 
new and innovative drugs. 
What does it mean for a drug to be “new and innovative?”  When 
 
88. In his 2003 testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Industry, Science and Technology, the CEO of GlaxoSmithKline stipulated that the NOC 
Regulations ensured balance within Canada’s patent regime and encouraged innovation into 
new therapies.  Jordan, supra note 3, at 66 (emphasis added).  For an example of 
pharmaceutical literature highlighting the importance of linkage regulations see CANADA’S 
RESEARCH-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES (RX&D) INFORMATION GUIDE 2002, 
Section 2: Industry Issues (2002); ASTRAZENECA CAN., THE PATENT ACT & LINKAGE 
REGULATIONS: ESSENTIAL TOOLS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF MEDICAL SCIENCE IN 
CANADA (2009), 
http://www.astrazeneca.ca/documents/en/aboutus/PatentActLinkageRegulations.pdf. 
89. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 
pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
90. Richard Epstein & Bruce Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical 
Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, n.24 (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 209, 2004) (citing Congressional Record – Senate at 23764 (August 10, 1984). 
91.  Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers 
to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623 (2005). 
92. H.R. Rep. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984). 
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drafting the NOC Regulations, the federal government did not provide 
specific definitions for these terms (in RIAS documents or otherwise), 
nor did it provide a Preamble as one often finds preceding legislation.  
The implication is that the matter was left for the courts to adjudicate or 
that the government did not, or would not, say one way or the other.93  
According to the Oxford International Dictionary,94 the word 
“innovate” evolved from the Latin innovare (1548), to make new.  The 
term focuses on bringing forth something completely new, novel, or 
revolutionary into existence.  The word “new,” from the Greek véos, 
Latin novus, and Old English néowe, refers to something that did not 
exist before; something that is brought into existence for the first time; is 
fresh; and not previously known.  Similarly, the word “novel” (1475), 
from the French nouveau and Latin novellum, refers to something that 
is fresh, or of recent origin, of a new kind or nature that is hitherto 
unknown.  Finally, the word “revolutionary,” from Old French and late 
Middle English (1450), refers to an instance of great change in a 
particular thing that is rare; an overthrow of the established way of 
doing things.  
The definition for each of these words is internally consistent and 
contains both qualitative and quantitative aspects that may be relevant 
to interpretation of the NOC Regulations.  The former refers to the 
notion that an innovative product (to use the current vernacular) is one 
that has not appeared before its introduction into the marketplace in 
any meaningful manner; while the latter may be taken to imply that the 
product is not only the first of its kind in existence but represents a truly 
revolutionary product rather than an incremental advance over existing 
products.  
 
93. Both the Canadian Medical Association and the Consumers Association of Canada 
in their evidence before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-91 requested that 
government take an evidence-based approach to research and development, and noted that 
no attempt was made by the government in the lead-up to Bill C-91 to empirically or 
objectively assess the potential impact of patent reforms on the costs and benefits to federal 
or provincial public health systems.  See supra notes 5 and 55, for comments by the Minister 
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs that at the time Bills C-22 and C-91 were being 
implemented, suggest Parliament did know that it was possible to measure innovation and 
construct a national pharmaceutical policy with balanced incentives and rewards, deciding 
instead the preferable route was to eschew this approach in favor of a system with neither 
output metrics nor proportionality.  Jordan, supra note 3; Harrison, supra note 4.  See 
generally Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:4 
Parliament of Canada, 4:8–10, 4A:18, (Nov. 27, 1992) and id. at 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 
5:53 (Nov. 30, 1992).   
94. OXFORD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
UNABRIDGED (1958). 
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As noted in our Berkeley study,95 while the plain meaning of the 
terms new and innovation are straight forward, published definitions of 
what should constitute an innovative drug range considerably based 
largely on industry affiliation.  At one end, industry supporters argue 
that a new and innovative drug is one that merely contains a NAS,96 to 
the slightly more stringent requirements of either being directed to First 
in Class therapies (irrespective of whether approval is directed to a new 
or follow-on drug)97 or to follow-on drugs that nevertheless undergo 
priority review.98  However, merely containing a NAS is an insufficient 
basis for designating a drug as pioneering or even as strongly innovative.  
This is because there is ample room in either definition for minor 
changes to previously approved medical ingredients, including salts, 
esters, solvates, polymorphs, and enantiomers.  A similar conclusion 
applies to drugs that are only directed to First in Class therapies, as 
these can also be follow-on versions of previously marketed products 
containing slightly modified medical ingredients or directed to new uses 
within a therapeutic class.  Similarly, where priority review need only be 
directed to drugs demonstrating moderate clinical improvement over 
existing therapies, it is also an insufficient proxy for strong innovation.  
The most plausible definition is that a truly new and innovative drug 
is one approved via the new drug approval pathway, one that contains a 
NAS, one that undergoes some form of priority review, and one that is 
directed to a First in Class therapy.99  Only in combination do these 
requirements approach a reasonable definition for a truly breakthrough 
or pioneering technology that would constitute a new and innovative 
drug, such as that contemplated by the NOC Regulations.  
The second policy goal underpinning the regulations is to facilitate 
the timely entry of generic drugs into the marketplace.  The definition 
of “timely” (1593), from the Old English adjective tímlíce, is to appear 
early, soon; quickly; or in good season.100  Thus, when something appears 
in a timely manner it does so at a time that provides the greatest benefit 
to those for whom it appears.  Given the public health goal of 
 
95. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14, at 1508. 
96. J.D. Kleinke, Commentary: Much Ado About a Good Thing, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 
1168, 1168 (2002). 
97. See COHEN 2005, supra note 22, at 78; U.S. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PROSPECTUS 
FOR NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT, COMMITTEE ON KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT 
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS   (1996). 
98. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14.  See, e.g., PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra 
note 21.  
99. Id. 
100. OXFORD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 94. 
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facilitating generic entry for cost savings purposes (for individual 
consumers and institutional payers), one can reasonably assume the 
timeliness of generic entry refers to the earliest possible date of patent 
expiry pertaining to a new and innovative drug.  This is consistent with 
the fact that the enabling section of the NOC Regulations is the 
infringement section pertaining to the early working provision.  As 
noted in the June 17, 2006 RIAS: 
 
On one end of the balance lies subsection 55.2(1) of the Patent 
Act, better known as the "early-working" exception.  In the 
pharmaceutical industry, early-working allows second- and 
subsequent-entry drug manufacturers (typically generic drug 
companies) to use a patented, innovative drug for the purpose of 
seeking approval to market a competing version of that drug.101 
 
As discussed in more detail below, however, the concept of early 
working did not,102 and indeed should not,103 refer to the working of any 
patent at any time.  It was intended to refer to a specific patent on a 
specific drug about to come off patent protection so as to allow generic 
firms to prepare for timely market entry.  A second element of this 
analysis is that a drug referred in Section 55.2(1) is not a new and 
innovative drug for the purposes of all time.  It is a drug that is new and 
innovative at a particular time in history.  The moment when this drug is 
no longer new or innovative, for example when it becomes the basis of 
SNDS submissions and follow-on drugs,104 constitutes the moment in 
history when patents are no longer in relation to new and innovative 
drugs, and thus, the moment that may reasonably trigger timely generic 
entry. 
A time-sensitive definition of patent protection for drugs that are 
“new and innovative” is consistent with policy debates preceding the 
 
101. 140 C. Gaz. Pt. I, at 1611 n.24 (2006) (emphasis added). 
102. During the parliamentary debates leading up to Bill C-91, it was clear that there 
would only be a small number of patents, indeed most often a single or main patent, to 
contend with in the early working scenario.  See generally testimony on this point by the 
Director General, Chemical and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) and testimony from Green Shield, id. at 34:7 
Parliament of Canada, 7:27 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
103. For the reasons why it should not are discussed in the review of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s “patent-specific” analysis, see infra Section IV.D. 
104. For example, the conversion from a mesylate to besylate salt form, a dihydrate to 
monohydrate crystalline form, a tablet to capsule form, between different stereoisomers or 
enantiomeric forms, etc., with little or no change in bioavailability, pharmacokinetics, and 
therapeutic benefit. 
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coming into force of Hatch-Waxman in the United States.  While 
acknowledging that multiple patents could be listed on the patent 
register, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom the Hatch-
Waxman amendment were referred by Congress, explicitly noted that 
the ability of brand firms to delay generic entry should be narrow both 
in scope and time; the proper time for generic entry being “the 
expiration date of the valid patent covering the original product” and 
that “there should be no other direct or indirect method of extending 
patent term.”105  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom Hatch-
Waxman was also referred, acknowledged that FDA rules restricting 
generic entry prior to Hatch-Waxman “had serious anti-competitive 
effects” and that the “net result of these rules has been the practical 
extension of the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the 
expiration of the patent.”106  The Committee on the Judiciary went 
further regarding the multiple patent listing issue, stating that it 
“accepted the rationale put forward by the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce concerning the need to avoid multiple patent term 
extensions” to the effect that “the only patented product which 
experiences any substantial regulatory delay is the first product patent 
(or if there is no product patent, the first process patent).”  As a result, 
the Committee concluded that any “subsequent patents on approved 
drug products are frequently not the same magnitude of innovation as 
occurs with respect to the initial patent” and that “on public policy and 
health policy grounds that only the first patent on a drug-type product 
should be extended.”107 Thus, there is substantial evidence in both 
Canada and the United States that the nexus between drug approval 
and patents should be narrow, both in scope and time. 
In choosing the words “the development of new and innovative 
drugs” to be one half of the balance linking patent law to food and drug 
law, federal governments in the United States and Canada articulated a 
clear public policy goal that pioneering drug development is desired in 
exchange for the “unusual protections” afforded to the pharmaceutical 
 
105. House Report No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984). At 30, the Committee stated: article 1, 
section 8, clause 8 of the constitution empowers congress to grant exclusive rights to an 
inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a definite time and, thereafter, 
immediate competition should be encouraged. For That reason, Title I of the bill permits the 
filing of abbreviated new drug applications before a patent expires and contemplates that the 
effective approval Date will be the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original 
Product. Other sections of title ii permit the extension of the term of a patent for a definite 
time provided certain conditions are met. There should be no other direct or indirect method 
of extending patent term. 
106. H.R. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984). 
107. Id. at 5–6. 
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industry by the linkage regime.108  Similarly, in choosing the words 
“timely market entry of their lower priced generic competitors” these 
governments articulated a second public policy goal of cost savings,109 
triggered by expiry of specific patents on specific drug forms that are no 
longer new and innovative.   
Based on the forgoing argument, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the “balance” sought to be effected by the NOC Regulations between 
food and drug law and patent law is not just a qualitative balance 
between two poles, but also a quantitative balance.  The more reward 
there is on the private side of the ledger, the more there must be on the 
public side in order to maintain a valid legal equilibrium.  
Our data indicate that generic market entry is substantially delayed 
by the linkage regime, and that rent-seeking behavior by brand-name 
pharmaceutical firms to leverage loopholes in the regime is passed on in 
the form of continued monopoly costs to the public.  Put another way, 
the results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 reveal the fact that not only has the 
production of new and innovative drugs declined over the last decade, 
but also that the legal protection of drugs under the linkage regime has 
conversely increased compared to the protection afforded via 
conventional infringement grounds.   
The data suggest that there are two components to the 
disequilibrium affected by the regulations “in operation.”  First, is the 
increase in private rewards compared to neutral public value, and 
second is the delay in generic entry compared to a neutral private 
reward.  Of note, the two components combine to produce a larger 
disequilibrium than either one alone. 
An investigation into the qualitative and quantitative nature of the 
balancing of public and private benefits such as that described above is 
consistent with the quid pro quo of the traditional patent bargain and 
the fact that the enabling statute for the NOC Regulations is the Patent 
Act.  With this in mind, the following section turns to the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s “patent-specific” analysis evidenced in its trilogy of 
cases on the NOC Regulations. 
 
108. The Federal Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme 
Court of Canada have repeatedly cited the language of the Supreme Court, which refers to 
the NOC Regulations as a “draconian regime” in its first decision on topic.  See Merck Frosst 
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Nat’l Health & Welfare), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193, ¶ 33 (Can.). 
109. As noted by the Committee on the Judiciary in its influential report (H.R. Rep. 
98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984), the public policy grounds achieved through early generic 
availability included: reduction of health care costs for the poor, the under-insured, elderly, 
and the government as a purchaser of prescription drugs.  
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C.  “Patent-Specific” Analysis 
The qualitative and quantitative interpretation of the original policy 
intent advocated above supports a specific reading of the application of 
Section 55.2 (infringement) to a narrow range of patents per drug rather 
than a general reading that would lay the groundwork for a broad and 
potentially indefinite extension of market exclusivity for already 
approved pharmaceuticals.  The starting point for the analysis is the 
enabling statute.  As noted by Driedger:  
 
It is not enough to ascertain the meaning of a regulation when 
read in light of its own object and the facts surrounding its 
making; it is also necessary to read the words conferring the 
power in the whole context of the authorizing statute.  The intent 
of the statute transcends and governs the intent of the 
regulation.110 
 
In its leading decisions on the linkage regime in Biolyse and 
AstraZeneca,111 the Supreme Court of Canada narrowly constrained its 
analysis on drug submissions and patent listing within the terms of the 
Patent Act, expressly stipulating a patent-specific analysis rather than a 
broad inclusive analysis of drug submissions and patents supporting 
market exclusivity under the NOC Regulations.112  The court held that 
while the balance sought is that between food and drug law and 
regulations and patent law and regulations,113 the objects of patent 
legislation and policy take precedence when interpreting the broad 
ambit of the NOC Regulations.  When analyzing cases under the NOC 
Regulations, courts are required to specifically consider the balance 
struck under the Patent Act whereby the public gives an inventor the 
right to monopoly protection of their invention in exchange for 
 
110. ELMER A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 247 (2d ed. 1983).  For 
discussion of Dredger’s approach to statutory interpretation in the context of NOC 
Regulations analysis, see Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
533 (Can.); AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550, ¶ 
26 (Can.). 
111. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at ¶ 26; AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 36. 
112. AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39. A “patent-specific analysis” was recently 
confirmed by Health Canada in its 2009 Guidance Document relating to the NOC 
Regulations.  HEALTH CANADA GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 26. In addition to 
acknowledging that a “patent-specific analysis” is necessary when interpreting the NOC 
Regulations, the government further stated that only certain patents are “eligible” for 
protection under the NOC Regulations, indicating that not all patents fall within the purview 
of the regulations.  Id. at 28.  See also AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39; Ferring Inc. v. 
Canada (Minister of Health), [2008] 1 F.C.R. 19, ¶¶ 51•57 (Can.). 
113. AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39. 
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disclosure of socially valuable information.114  In Biolyse, the court held 
that when contemplating inventions in the field of patented medicines, 
we must be mindful of the fact that Parliament was concerned not only 
with the balance between inventors and potential users, but also “that 
between protection of intellectual property on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, the desire to reduce health care costs while being fair to 
those whose ingenuity brought the drugs into existence in the first 
place.”115  As a result, claims such as those by Industry Canada, that 
poor or otherwise inefficient working of the NOC Regulations resulting 
in evergreening of older products can be counter-balanced by the 
benefits of a patent regime that gives multi-national firms confidence in 
Canada,116 must be tempered by legal assessment of relevant evidence 
pertaining to the functioning of the regulations in light of legislative 
intent.  This latter statement is consistent with amendments to the NOC 
Regulations specifically intended to limit evergreening through abuse of 
the automatic stay provision.117 
If the public benefits of innovation are raised under the linkage 
regulations through the terms of the patent bargain,118 then how much 
does one ask for in exchange for the unusual protections of the linkage 
regime?  The term “patent bargain” is usually used to refer to a grant of 
a limited patent monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of socially 
valuable knowledge.119  In a public health context, where drug approval 
and drug patenting are linked, the essence of the patent bargain may be 
viewed as the exchange of extended patent protection for a socially 
beneficial level of pharmaceutical innovation that is proportional to the 
benefit to firms of extending market exclusivity.  Thus, the public 
expects, and should expect, something of substantial value in exchange 
for extended patent protection and monopoly pricing.  In other words, 
there should be a strong functional legal nexus between public health 
 
114. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 533. 
115. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 533, ¶ 2. 
116. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1593 (2008).  This is a similar statement to that found 
in all post-2004 RIAS documents that the NOC Regulations provide “stability, predictability 
and competitiveness” to Canada’s pharmaceutical patent regime.  See generally 138 C. Gaz. 
50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. I, 1390, 1588 (2008). 
117. See 132 C. Gaz. 11 Pt. I, 553 (1998); 133 C. Gaz. 21 Pt. II, 2355 (1999); 138 C. Gaz. 
50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1588 (2008). 
118. Bouchard 2010, supra note 13. 
119. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398 (2007); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067 (Can.).  For general 
discussion, see Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S [sic] Supreme Court 
Patent Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights Landscape, 15 HEALTH 
L.J. 221 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard KSR Part 1]. 
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policy and patent policy.  
The social benefits of approval-patenting linkage are also implied by 
the obligation on courts to carefully scrutinize pharmaceutical patents to 
determine if they properly merit the grant of a monopoly privilege in 
light of the substantial public interest at stake,120 as well as the 
observation that the linkage regulations are deemed to involve “special 
enforcement provisions” that operate well beyond the purview of 
traditional patent law.121  As stated in Whirlpool,122 the bargain between 
patentee and public is in the interest of both sides only where the 
patentee receives a monopoly reward that is proportional to what it 
discloses to the public; a patentee who evergreens an invention via 
successive patents on uninventive additions prolongs its monopoly 
beyond what the public has agreed to pay.  
Two cases in particular are instructive about how narrow the 
functional linkage between the rights of the inventor and those of the 
public in the context of the patent bargain should be.  In AstraZeneca v. 
Canada, the Supreme Court held that the listing provisions of the NOC 
Regulations are linked only to a “specific” drug submission rather than 
a general submission.  The court held that a general listing provision 
would allow undue evergreening,123 which would be inconsistent with the 
intent of Parliament in enacting the NOC Regulations.  A broad 
interpretation of the listing provision was seen by the court to 
undermine the balance sought by Parliament between the objectives of 
food and drug law and patent law,124 with the result that the public 
would not derive appropriate benefit from patent legislation—in this 
case from properly listed patents.  The court stipulated that this scenario 
“offends the ‘balance’ inherent to the quid pro quo” in that the 
“patentee takes too much in exchange for a weakly innovative 
invention.”125 
In other words, the functional legal nexus between patent law and 
food and drug law was insufficiently narrow to support the extension of 
a patent monopoly on weakly innovative drugs via the linkage regime.   
The court also held that ambiguity as to the specific intent of a 
 
120. Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. 
Comm’r of Patents [1966] S.C.R. 604 (Can.). 
121. 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1598 (2006). 
122. Whirlpool, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 37 (Can.).  See also Free World Trust v. Électro 
Santé  Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 13 (Can.). 
123. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550, ¶ 
23 (Can.). 
124. Id. at ¶ 39. 
125. Id. at ¶ 39. 
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regulation does not have to manifest itself in specific statutory text in 
order to be properly considered by the court.  Rather, such ambiguity 
should be analyzed within the entire context of the legislation.126  
Importantly, the court overruled a general listing requirement 
notwithstanding the acceptable industrial strategy of firms to evergreen 
products by “adding bells and whistles to a pioneering product even 
after the original patent for [the] pioneering product has expired.”127  
This result was based on the finding that an overly broad interpretation 
of the NOC Regulations was inconsistent with the narrow terms of 
Parliament’s intent in enacting the regulations and offended the quid 
pro quo of the traditional patent bargain. 
A similar result was obtained in Biolyse v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(BMS) again using a patent-specific analysis.  Here the Supreme Court 
dealt with what constituted a brand-name versus a generic “submission” 
and, thus, whether a second-entry firm needs to litigate all listed patents 
prior to market entry.  BMS argued that a drug submission should be 
construed broadly to include all submissions, whereas Biolyse argued 
that the term should be interpreted narrowly.  While the word 
“submission” was seen to provide an entry into analysis of statutory 
language governing submissions, the court noted that the term 
submission was not specifically defined in the regulations.  Under the 
terms of its earlier decision in Bell ExpressVu,128 the court saw its duty to 
consider the entire context of the provision and enabling legislation 
before undertaking a specific analysis of the term.  
Taking a purposive approach, the court held that the term 
submission should be analyzed in its narrow sense rather than a broad 
general sense.  A general interpretation was seen to lead to the absurd 
result whereby a submission by one firm relevant to a medication 
encompassed all further submissions relating to that medication, thus 
allowing the original patentee to evergreen its product via ever 
diminishing minor improvements.  This scenario was seen to push the 
regulations well beyond its stated purpose, stifle competition and 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, and yield a result at odds 
with legislative intent.129  The section was held to be ultra vires based on 
breach of the quid pro quo such that the patentee could extend its 
monopoly far beyond what its skill and ingenuity contributed to the 
 
126. Id. at ¶¶ 29–30. 
127. Id. at ¶ 39. 
128. Bell ExpressVu Ltd. v. Rex, [2002] S.C.R. 42, ¶ 10 (Can.). 
129. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶¶ 65–67 
(Can.). 
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public.  As with AstraZeneca, the court’s decision was patent-specific 
and hinged on a narrow rather than general nexus between drug 
approval and drug patenting.  
A strong lesson from Biolyse and AstraZeneca is that critical to 
analysis of whether pharmaceutical linkage is a success or failure in 
achieving its twin policy goals is the long-held exercise in patent 
jurisprudence to ensure the patent owner is not getting more of a 
monopoly than the public bargained for despite claims of the patentee 
(and its industry and government supporters) to the contrary.130  
Innumerable cases have been brought before the courts based more on 
imagined, or hypothetical, inventions rather than real ones.  When only 
patent law is construed, the difference is whether or not the inventions 
satisfy the requirements set out in relevant patent legislation.  This is 
not so with regard to the NOC Regulations, which provide for a specific 
legal and functional link among the drug approved, its relevant patents, 
and whether they are listed on the patent register.  The unique nature of 
the interrelationship between the Food and Drug Act, Food and Drugs 
Regulations, Patent Act, and Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations was recognized in this regard by the federal 
government in its lengthy 2004 RIAS: “Despite their seemingly 
competing policy objectives, it is important that neither instrument 
[Patent Act, NOC Regulations] be considered in isolation, as the 
intended policy can only be achieved when the two operate in a 
balanced fashion.”131   
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is plausible to argue that 
the interpretation of what constitutes sufficient grounds for the “special 
protection” afforded by the NOC Regulations may be seen to differ 
from the threshold for patentability per se.  
Indeed, the difference between real and imagined inventiveness has 
been previously recognized by regulators in the context of the NOC 
Regulations and used to negate the protection of the regulations for 
inventions where a patentee failed to demonstrate a strong connection 
between the invention sought to be protected and the product sought to 
be approved.132  This suggests that the concept of early working should 
 
130. Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 42 (Can.). 
131. 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. 1, 3712 (2004). 
132. 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. 1, 1598, 1611–12 (2006).  The government specifically stipulated 
that: 
[A] temporal connection between the invention sought to be protected and the 
product sought to be approved.  This ensures that patents for inventions discovered 
after the existence of a product do not pre-empt generic competition on that 
product.  Similarly, the relevance requirement limits the protection of the 
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not refer to the working of any patent at any time.  Rather, the early 
working provision specifically, and hence the empirical outputs of the 
linkage regime more generally, should only encompass patents relating 
to a specific drug that is new and innovative for the first time in history.  
The early working provision should not encompass patents that form 
the basis of SNDS submissions and follow-on drugs.  Ironically, this 
approach was supported by the federal government in its testimony 
before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-91.  That testimony 
stated that a new and innovative drug was said to have “[one] main 
patent” and “w[h]en that main patent expires, anyone may copy that 
product and bring it to market.”133  As discussed above, a similar 
conclusion was reached by both the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce and the Committee on the Judiciary at the time the 
originating Hatch-Waxman regime came into force. 
In light of government reports and jurisprudence on topic, one can 
reasonably conclude that the linkage regime was never intended to act 
as a vehicle for continuous evergreening of blockbuster products.  At 
least with regards to Canadian law, pharmaceutical linkage was 
intended to provide for international harmonization of Canada’s patent 
laws balanced by a narrow (patent-specific) exemption to the 
infringement section of the Patent Act in order to allow the early 
working of generic drugs prior to expiration of the main patent on a 
given drug.  To paraphrase Justice Binnie in Free World Trust,134 there is 
 
PM(NOC) Regulations to that which the innovator has invested time and money to 
test and have approved for sale.  This prevents hypothetical innovation from 
impeding generic market entry and encourages innovators to bring their latest 
inventions to market.  Finally, in only allowing patents to be listed which contain 
claims for the medicine or its use, the subject matter requirement makes it clear that 
innovations without direct therapeutic application, such as processes or 
intermediates, do not merit the special enforcement protection of the PM (NOC) 
Regulations. 
Id. at 1612–13. 
133. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
134. Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 42 (Can.).  The 
court states: 
The patent system is designed to advance research and development and to 
encourage broader economic activity.  Achievement of these objectives is 
undermined however if competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent 
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision and certainty.  A patent of 
uncertain scope becomes “a public nuisance” . . . . 
R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp. (1936), 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (Eng. 
C.A.).   
Potential competitors are deterred from working in areas that are not in fact 
covered by the patent even though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case 
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a high economic cost attached to taking an overly broad approach to 
assessing the nexus between drug approval and drug patenting.  
Continuing the analogy, we might also say that it is the proper policy of 
patent law to keep the legal nexus between the scope of patent 
protection and the scope of innovation narrowly construed rather than 
broadly construed, and to assess the integrity of this nexus in light of all 
relevant empirical evidence.  Otherwise, as at issue in Biolyse and 
AstraZeneca, the pharmaceutical linkage regime may stifle innovation, 
operate beyond its stated purpose, and yield a result that is at odds with 
legislative intent.  
D.  Statutory Interpretation 
The purpose of this Section of the Article is to raise the possibility 
that empirical evidence demonstrating that legislation does not achieve 
its ends can support the conclusion that the legislation is invalid or in 
need of substantial amendment in order for it to remain intra vires.  An 
ancillary goal is to explore whether there are aspects of statutory 
interpretation that illuminate an investigation into whether the NOC 
Regulations are meeting the stated goals of stimulating the development 
of new and innovative drugs and facilitating timely entry of generic 
drugs, and the manner in which this question may be assessed from a 
purposive perspective. 
According to the principles of purposive analysis as recently 
reviewed by Hutchinson in the context of intellectual property,135 the 
essence of ordinary language is paramount to the exercise of statutory 
interpretation.  The ordinary language of a statute or regulation is 
informed contextually by the scheme and purpose as well as evidence of 
statutory intent.136  Referred to as “external context,”137 the interface 
between original policy intent and the consequences thereof in the real 
world informed by the original policy intent refers to “how the 
 
of patent disputes can be very costly and protracted indeed) might confirm that what 
the competitors propose to do is entirely lawful.  Potential investment is lost or 
otherwise directed. Competition is “chilled”.  The patent owner is getting more of a 
monopoly than the public bargained for.  There is a high economic cost attached to 
uncertainty and it is the proper policy of patent law to keep it to a minimum. 
Id.  
135. See generally Cameron Hutchinson, Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A 
Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
136. Id. at 7. 
137. RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
STATUTES 20 (4th ed. 2002). 
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legislation works operationally.”138  As a reminder, the twin policy goals 
underpinning the NOC Regulations are to stimulate the development of 
new and innovative drugs and to facilitate timely generic entry.  In the 
present circumstances, the term external context could thus reasonably 
be assumed to encompass empirical evidence of the extent and manner 
in which the NOC Regulations affect (1) the production of new and 
innovative remedies and (2) the timely entry of generic remedies once 
the original product patent has expired.  Considerations of external 
context are those which privilege the setting in which a law operates, i.e., 
empirically, as a response to a set of evolving institutions and 
relationships.139  
The construction of law as a dynamic and adaptive (or maladaptive) 
system with multiple interconnected and interdependent nodes is 
consistent with arguments made on the potential impact of Bill C-91 by 
the Canadian Association of Consumers (CAC) discussed in Section 
II.A. supra.  Of particular relevance, the CAC pointed out that in 
exchange for patent reforms including linkage Canada could possibly be 
contributing to capital market protectionism by multinational 
pharmaceutical firms, a likely preference by firms and regulators for 
low-level innovations (Me Too and other follow-on drugs), as well as 
minimal positive social welfare outcomes given the preference for 
enhanced follow-on innovations.  These concerns were echoed in the 
testimony of U.S.-based economist Stephen Schondelmeyer who 
underscored the potential of pharmaceutical linkage to result in 
significantly enhanced market exclusivity periods and cautioned the 
Parliamentary Committee to think through the issue of unintended 
consequences when constructing a system of innovation where new drug 
development and generic entry are fundamentally tied to patents on 
older products. 
The notion of law as a complex system can also be seen in selected 
writings of Fuller and Dworkin to the extent that the purpose, indeed 
the validity, of law may be ascertained by the evolving context in which 
it operates.140  The notion that law is “alive” rather than stagnant draws 
strong parallels to legal and other social sciences scholarship 
 
138. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7. 
139. Id. at 7–8. 
140. Id. at 27 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 221–30 (2d ed. 2006)) 
(suggesting that statutes may evolve in ways contrary or against the initial intent, allowing for 
an adaptive assessment of the validity of a law against contemporary evidence of its operation 
or functioning). 
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demonstrating law to be a dynamic complex adaptive system.141  In such 
systems, law-in-operation is strongly contingent on positive and negative 
feedback loops that impact system performance,142 including systems of 
intellectual property law and biomedical innovation.143 
 
141. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9 (2007). 
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the system maintain a 
degree of independence from one another.  Thus, removing one such element 
[which reduces the level of complication] does not fundamentally alter the system’s 
behavior apart from that which directly resulted from the piece that was removed.  
Complexity arises when the dependencies among the elements become important.  
In such a system, removing one such element destroys system behavior to an extent 
that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular element that is removed.  
Complexity is a deep property of a system, whereas complication is not.  
Id. at 9.   
142. Feedback interactions in complex systems have received increased attention in 
recent years.  See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS 
CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND 
EVERYTHING ELSE (2003) (investigating the role of feedback in biological and social 
networks, including corporations and living organisms, producing system fitness); JAMES 
GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987) (describing order and chaos generally and 
how complex systems balance the two through adaptation and positive and negative feedback 
loops); JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS (MIT 
Press 1992) (1975) [hereinafter HOLLAND 1992] (outlining the importance of adaptive 
mechanisms in natural and artificial systems to the growth and destruction of complex 
systems); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 
(1995) [hereinafter HOLLAND 1995] (discussing adaptation in complex adaptive systems and 
how order and disorder are often balanced at subtle levels in these systems); STEVEN 
JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND 
SOFTWARE (2001) (discussing the characteristics of emergent systems, including the role of 
positive and negative feedback loops in governing de-centralized system growth and 
adaptation); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE 
LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995) (investigating the conditions that 
give rise to the growth and destruction of complex adaptive systems and describing how 
optimal complex adaptive systems are balanced on the edge of chaos); GRÉGOIRE NICOLIS & 
ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING COMPLEXITY: AN INTRODUCTION (1989) (addressing the 
problem of complexity in using mathematical modeling and the role of essentially irreducible 
uncertainty in complex systems); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING 
SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992) (discussing the role of the inter-
relation and inter-dependence of players, including individuals and institutions, in complex 
adaptive systems and showing that systems of this nature are never in stasis, but rather always 
continually evolving); Brian W. Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 
92–99 (1990) (discussing the presence of feedback in producing order and simplicity even in 
the most complex economic systems). 
143. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14; Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact 
of U.S [sic] Supreme Court Patent Law on Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation 
Ecologies, 15 HEALTH L.J. 247, 274 (2007); Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is 
Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that Binds Obviousness and 
Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 4 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bouchard 2007b]; Ron A. Bouchard, Reflections on the Value of Systems Models for 
Regulation of Medical Research and Product Development, 17 HEALTH L. REV. 30, 32 (2008).  
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Another principle of statutory interpretation that may be 
particularly relevant to analysis of the linkage regime is that 
interpretation of legislative intent entails an understanding of what 
“mischief” the statute or regulation was intended to remedy at the time 
it was enacted.144  Review of the matters before the House of Commons 
Legislative Committee on Bill C-91 indicate a clear concern with 
stimulating the production of globally competitive innovative 
pharmaceutical technologies balanced by the cost considerations of 
promoting early generic entry.  These goals are entirely consistent with 
the original policy intent underpinning the regulations enumerated in 
RIAS documents, ranging from 1993 to the present, to balance the 
production of new and innovative drugs with timely entry of generic 
products.  Important to the type of balancing function inherent in the 
NOC Regulations, Parliament is assumed to avoid promulgating laws 
and regulations that conflict with one another.145  Implicit in both the 
purposive and mischief analyses is the recognition of indeterminate 
considerations when making law and public policy that cannot be 
predicted,146 yet which nevertheless must be accounted for in later 
assessments of legislative purpose or effect. 
When courts are presented with competing interpretations (i.e., 
general or specific; Patent Act or Food & Drugs Act; health policy v. 
industrial policy), the clear choice is one that accords most substantively 
with the legislative purpose and one that is consistent with an 
interpretation of a given statute or regulation as a “workable whole.”147  
In other words, the law and policy of the legislation or regulation need 
to operate consistently with one another from an operational 
perspective.  As noted by Fuller: 
 
The troublesome cases are in reality resolved not in advance by 
the legislator, but at the point of application.  This means that in 
applying the statute the judge or police sergeant must be guided 
not simply by the words but also by some conception of what is 
fit and proper to come into the park; conceptions of this sort are 
implicit in the practices and attitudes of the society of which he is 
 
144. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7–8 (citing RANDAL N. GRAHAM, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE  31 (2001)). 
145. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7. 
146. Id. at 21. 
147. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968) [hereinafter ANATOMY]; Lon L. 
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667 
[hereinafter Fidelity].  For a discussion of Fuller’s work in the context of intellectual property 
litigation, see Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 22–24.  
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a member. . . .  All this adds up to the conclusion that an 
important part of the statute in question is not made by the 
legislator, but grows and develops as an implication of complex 
practices and attitudes which may themselves be in a state of 
development or change.148  
 
As implied in the passage from Fuller, the purpose and intent of a 
statute or regulation is not static.  Rather, it represents a dynamic 
process of refining and clarifying means and ends through a system of 
positive and negative feedback loops.149  In other words, the intent and 
meaning of legislation or regulation is how it operates “in the lives of 
people affected by it,” not theoretically or hypothetically as an isolated 
idea or even goal.  This, importantly, includes objective evidence of the 
operation of statutes and regulations such as empirical evidence of 
contextual operational efficiency.150  
A final point, which has not escaped the notice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada151 or the U.S. Federal Circuit,152 is that courts are not 
the only legal authorities deciding whether legislation or regulations are 
valid or invalid.  When faced with growing evidence of the lack of 
success of any legal vehicle, it is the role of the legislature to learn and 
dynamically adapt to external signals relating to its original policy 
intent, and to decide rationally in an evidence-based manner whether to 
abandon either the law or the original policy intent given objective 
evidence of how a statute or regulation operates in the ‘real world.’  
Where objective empirical evidence such as that reviewed from Studies 
1, 2, and 3 shows that the vehicle is operating in contrast to its stated 
and dynamically interpreted goals, it may be ultra vires153 or otherwise 
operating outside of its stated ambit.154 
 
148. See ANATOMY, supra note 147, at 59 (emphasis added).  As noted by Hutchinson, 
“[t]he process of interpreting a statute is not just drawing out what legislators put into it but 
adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to which it is to be 
applied.”  See Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 24 n.129.  “In this sense it may be said that no 
enacted law ever comes from its legislator wholly and fully ‘made.’”  Id.  
149. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 23 (referring to Fidelity, supra note 147, at 668.) 
150. Hutchinson, supra note 135. 
151. Virtually every domestic legal commentator and lawyer writing or litigating this 
issue has referenced the Merck court’s description of the NOC Regulations as “draconian.”  
See Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193, ¶ 33 (Can.). 
152. Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
153. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.). 
154. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550 
(Can.). 
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E.  Revisiting the Empirical Data 
In the discussion above, we saw that courts look favorably on 
evidence relating to how a statute or regulation operates in the real 
world, and that law can be viewed in the context of statutory 
interpretation as a dynamic legal construct that may or may not evolve 
away from its stated goal or purpose.  What, then, is the evidence that 
operation of linkage regulations is inconsistent with the intent of the 
federal government to encourage the development, or even to simply 
protect patents relating to, new and innovative drugs?  Indeed, there are 
two major sets of observations from our empirical work to suggest that 
the operation of the linkage regulations is inconsistent with the goal 
underpinning the linkage regime.  The first set of observations relates to 
drug patenting and the specific levels of innovation supported by these 
patents.  The second set of observations relates to how, in combination, 
drug approval, drug patenting, and the pharmaceutical linkage regime 
act in a coordinated manner to increase the effective period of market 
exclusivity to the detriment of timely generic entry. 
First, we observed a time-dependent decrease in new drug 
development over a nearly ten-year period, well after the NOC 
Regulations came into force.  This was accompanied by a concomitant 
increase, in some cases non-linear, in the development of follow-on 
drugs.  The data reviewed above indicate that these trends have 
occurred seemingly independently of strong time-dependent trends in 
drug patenting, patent listing, and in drug approvals, consistent with the 
principles of emerging lifecycle regulatory models of drug regulation.  
The results demonstrate that pharmaceutical firms, when they so desire, 
are capable of responding rapidly and strongly to regulatory incentives 
in the context of drug regulation, but that this responsiveness has not 
extended to increasing the production of new and innovative drugs.  An 
additional observation is that when drug approval data are analyzed 
cumulatively, there is a vanishingly small fraction (1.87%) of brand-
name drugs that are truly “new and innovative.”  It is difficult to believe 
that when Parliament stipulated that only patents on new and 
innovative drugs were to be protected via the new pharmaceutical 
linkage law it had this low level of innovation in mind.  Here, it is 
important to bear in mind that, unlike other industries, incremental 
innovations that have little or no therapeutic value to individual patients 
may nevertheless be used as tools to extend the market exclusivity for 
blockbuster drugs with broad social value that would otherwise come off 
patent. 
The second primary finding of our work is that operation of the 
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NOC Regulations increases the effective period of patent protection by 
at least two-fold beyond the normal period.  As such, the evidence 
suggests that the linkage regulations are being used as more of a sword 
than a shield by pharmaceutical firms.  The degree of protection offered 
is indiscriminate, and is not specific to high value inventions.  Indeed, 
the observation in both the U.S. and Canada that up to 75% of listed 
patents are invalid when litigated on the merits155 supports the 
conclusion that the functional nexus between drug approval and drug 
patenting need only be very weak (i.e., general) to support a significant 
extension of the patent monopoly for drugs coming off patent 
protection under the NOC Regulations.  This scenario is worsened by a 
weak relevance standard for patent listing,156 particularly one that 
permits listing of multiple patents on follow-on drugs with little change 
in benefit:risk.  Thus, not only has the linkage regime not resulted in the 
development of new and innovative drugs, it has also failed to stimulate 
the “timely market entry of generic drugs.”  Therefore, both limbs of 
the balance inherent in the original policy intent underpinning the 
linkage regime are offended. 
Supporting the conclusion above is the finding that patenting of 
drugs by pharmaceutical firms has escalated substantially since the 
coming into force of the NOC Regulations, providing increasing fodder 
for the patent listing and automatic stay mechanisms under the 
regulations.  Related to this is the finding that cumulative patenting and 
patent listing have converged strongly over time, and that the delay 
between drug approval and patent listing has declined to the point that 
the patent listing now seems a better proxy of drug development in 
Canada than patenting per se.  Trends in new and follow-on drugs were 
not altered by the increasing application of the principles of lifecycle 
regulation, which, like the NOC Regulations, is also strongly premised 
on the production of new and innovative drug products in exchange for 
strong intellectual property and regulatory rights.157  Thus, in the 
 
155. EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD: EVERGREENING OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE) 
REGULATIONS OF CANADA’S PATENT ACT (2004), 
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf; Andrew A. Caffrey, 
III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug 
Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13, ¶ 27 
(2004); Edward Hore, A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic 
Pharmaceutical Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (1999–2000).  
156. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390 (2008) (clarifying judicial rulings on topic in 2006 by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca and the Federal Court of Appeal in Wyeth 
Canada. v. ratiopharm, inc., [2008] 1 F.C.R. 447 (Can.)). 
157. Ron A. Bouchard & Monika Sawicka, The Mud and the Blood and the Beer: 
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absence of a reward system that is proportional to the degree of 
innovation, lifecycle-based drug regulation is not likely to alter the 
profile of domestic drug development. 
Findings from empirical studies such as those in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
support the conclusion that the patterns for new and follow-on drugs 
may not be reflective, as claimed by industry and its supporters, of low 
hanging fruit already being picked, or escalating costs of drug 
development.  This does not mean that a significant fraction of the low-
hanging fruit has not been picked or that drug development has not 
become more expensive over time.  Rather, results demonstrating a 
time-gated and increasing focus by firms on follow-on drug 
development, and on broadening the scope and number of patents, 
patent type classifications, and therapeutic classifications supporting 
them, suggest that firms may be aiming ex ante at discrete legal targets 
provided for by law.  In the absence of demonstrable intent by 
government otherwise, this would be of no concern.  However, in both 
the United States and Canada, federal governments have in fact stated 
that the twin goals of pharmaceutical linkage are to provide strong 
patent protection for new and innovative drugs while also facilitating 
rapid generic entry, and that these goals are to be achieved in the form 
of a specific legal nexus between drug approval and drug patenting 
informed by legal and policy grounds underpinning the legislation.  
Contrary to the original policy behind the NOC Regulations, brand-
name firms appear to have decreased their innovative output following 
the coming into force of the linkage regime while at the same time 
engaging in increased evergreening of already appropriated 
technologies using the linkage regulations as the preferred vehicle for 
patent extension.  The empirical data show that, at best, the linkage 
between patent law and food and drug law is general rather than specific 
in nature.  This is indicative of a weak legal and functional nexus 
between the scope of innovation and scope of patent protection; thus, 
raising the possibility that the NOC Regulations might, in principle, 
infringe the quid pro quo of the patent bargain and produce a result that 
is at odds with legislative intent.  
Based on the data presented thus far, one can argue that both ends 
of the balancing function of the linkage regime (stimulating new and 
innovative drug development and facilitating timely entry of generic 
drugs) are operating poorly or at least very inefficiently.  On the one 
hand, generic competition is being stifled owing to a two-fold increase in 
 
Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework for Drug Approval, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 
49, 51 (2009). 
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the term of patent protection under the regulations on patents that are 
weakly relevant to the reference product and that are often invalid 
when litigated on the merits.  On the other, strong intellectual property 
protection is consistently and increasingly being afforded under the 
regulations for patents that are not in relation to new and innovative 
drugs, including those with a paradoxical approval-patent linkage.  As 
suggested earlier, this suggests that there are two components to the 
disequilibrium affected by the regulations “in operation.”  First, is the 
increase in private rewards compared to neutral public value, and 
second is the delay in generic entry compared to a neutral private 
reward.  The two components combine to produce a larger 
disequilibrium than either one alone. 
An observation that remains politically charged to this day, for 
jurisdictions with pharmaceutical linkage or those contemplating 
bringing into force some form of linkage, is that drug development by 
domestic firms over the last decade has been strongly focused on 
technology appropriation.  This is somewhat ironic, as one of the major 
concerns of policy-makers in the early stages of development of the 
NOC Regulations was to “thwart” appropriation by generic drug 
companies of innovative technologies propagated by brand-name drug 
companies,158 typically articulated as “rights piracy.”  As discussed 
above, the term “appropriation” is usually used to refer to a party’s 
ability to capture profits generated from their own inventions or related 
inventions.  
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that not only are generic 
firms not unduly appropriating innovative technologies, but even if 
obtaining an NOC based on bioequivalence grounds could be construed 
as appropriation, generic firms are only following the lead of brand-
name firms who are themselves focusing on follow-on approvals while at 
the same time decreasing new drug development activities.  This led us 
to conclude in our McGill study159 that the domestic limbs of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies are “doing more with less.”  As 
such, not just brand-name firms, but all forms of domestic 
pharmaceutical companies we studied over the course of nearly a 
decade are focusing a progressively greater share of their patenting and 
regulatory approval energy on appropriating, or extending the value, of 
existing technologies over time, presumably relying on the acquisition of 
 
158. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶ 45 
(Can.) (citing Apotex Inc. v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 742 (Can.), aff’d [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100 
(Can.)). 
159. See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11. 
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pioneering biotechnology firms as their technologies crystallize through 
clinical trials. 
Finally, the results reviewed in this Article have some important 
implications for innovation theory in general, which holds that follow-on 
or incremental innovation is equally important to overall domestic 
productivity and prosperity as pioneering innovation.  However, unlike 
other industries, follow-on innovations in the pharmaceutical sector 
often have little or no therapeutic benefit for the population at large 
compared to existing drug products.  While this is obviously not true for 
all follow-on drugs, when the system is effectively gamed, the multiple 
patent listing provision in combination with weak evidentiary 
requirements for new and follow-on drug approval can be used to 
powerfully extend market exclusivity for blockbuster drugs in a manner 
that impacts drug pricing for both public and private payers.  Patents on 
products within a cluster can be used for this purpose either by 
providing the basis for follow-on drug submissions or by providing a 
large pool for patenting listing purposes.  In either case, breakthrough 
innovation is diminished at the same time as the timely entry of generic 
products is delayed.  Thus, as noted supra, the social consequences of a 
regulatory preference for follow-on drugs may be much greater in the 
public health sector than other sectors of the economy. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL LAW AND POLICY 
A.  Theory of Linkage-Based Drug Development 
The data, law and policy reviewed in this Article demonstrate that 
pharmaceutical linkage creates a specific and empirically observable 
legal nexus between drug approval, drug patents, and patent litigation.  
This nexus can profoundly shape market entry for brand-name and 
generic drugs, and thus access to essential medications.  
Our work thus far suggests that the scope of this legal nexus depends 
on at least four discrete mechanisms provided for by law: (1) the type of 
drug submission; (2) the type of drug patent; (3) the legal standard for 
patent listing; and (4) how many patents are listed on the patent 
register.  As such, the nexus can be broad (weak) or narrow (specific).  
The lower the evidentiary standard for new or follow-on drug approval, 
the easier patents are to come by, the easier it is to list patents on the 
patent register, and the more patents that can be listed on the patent 
register, the weaker the legal nexus between approval and patenting. 
The discrete legal mechanisms underpinning the linkage regime as 
they operate in tandem with the evidentiary requirements for drug 
approval appear to provide an excellent vehicle for the development of 
2011] 
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valuable to develop a working model of innovation that would identify 
functional linkages between different drugs, patents, and listed patents, 
and how these linkages combine (and re-combine) over time to delay 
generic entry.  The goal of work underway by our group, parallel to 
three-dimensional models of protein folding, is to convert data such as 
that shown in Figs. 1 and 7 into a series of 3-D models that will allow 
politicians, law-makers, the judiciary, and scholars to track the evolution 
of clusters over time, both with regard to their structure and function.  
In this manner, rotational 3-D cluster models would enable visual and 
numerical quantification of the impact of clustering on generic entry in 
the same manner that one might look at a car from behind (highlighting 
the “gas tank,” or original drug product and associated patent tandems) 
as well as from the side (from the rear to the front of the vehicle, 
underscoring how and when approvals, patents, and listed patents 
increase over time with market and regulator vetting).  
In a best case scenario, data such as these could be paired with 
objective evidence of the level of innovation and therapeutic benefit 
associated with various follow-on drugs in the cluster, allowing for 
weighted algorithms to be created for pricing and reimbursement 
purposes.  Such algorithms may also provide an evidence-based 
empirical indicator of the need by governments to fund high-risk 
research and development activities by pharmaceutical companies. 
Product clusters may have particular relevance for loopholes within 
the linkage regime that allow for what we referred to in our 
Northwestern study as a “paradoxical approval-patent linkage.”  The 
paradoxical nature of the drug approval-drug patenting nexus refers to 
the situation where multiple line extensions occur within a cluster that 
in turn are allowed, via the multiple patent listing provision, to extend 
market exclusivity on the original new drug form, but also all other 
chemically-related drug forms against which they may be listed on the 
patent register over time.  
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Fig. 8. Paradoxical Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Nexus.  Left and right axes represent increases 
(profit) and decreases (welfare) in firm profits and public welfare resulting from an increase in 
market exclusivity associated follow-on drug product clusters as the number of line extensions and 
cumulative patent protection for the product cluster increase.  Both profit and public welfare are 
assumed for the sake of simplicity to change linearly from the origin.  The upward arrow represents 
profit whereas the downward arrow represents public welfare.  The graph indicates that increases 
in the duration of market exclusivity (and hence monopoly pricing) on drug clusters with little 
public welfare benefit yield an increasingly paradoxical relationship between the scope of patent 
protection per cluster and the degree of social benefit associated with that protection.  
 
As illustrated in Fig. 8, as the number of follow-on drugs in the 
cluster grows over time so too does cumulative market exclusivity and 
firm profit.  The maximum point of inefficiency (or the most 
‘paradoxical’ drug approval-drug patenting nexus) occurs when the 
product cluster has a very long duration of cumulative market 
exclusivity with little or no therapeutic benefit to the larger population 
compared with the original pioneering drug on which the cluster is 
based.  Given that empirical data are only beginning to be reported, this 
clustering effect may present a more substantial barrier to generic entry 
than previously recognized, and it is not clear whether generics are 
being adequately compensated for taking on the risk of litigation. 
A critical element of empirical work done by us and/or other groups 
going forward should be to assess clustering data before and after 
critical amendments to linkage laws, such as those aimed at reducing the 
automatic stay from many to one per reference product and narrowing 
the scope of listable patents from those generally on a marketed drug to 
those only relevant to the specific drug submission against which they 
are listed. 
B.  Globalization of Pharmaceutical Linkage 
As discussed at the beginning of the Article, prompt and affordable 
access to essential medicines is a significant component of most 
domestic and global models of public health.  The availability and costs 
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of new and generic drugs is a function of traditional patent law 
incentives and emerging linkage regulations.160  Patent law is a well 
described,161 if controversial,162 “policy lever” for stimulating the 
development of new drugs.163  As discussed throughout this Article, 
linkage regulations tie generic drug availability to existing drug patents 
by connecting approval to the resolution of patent validity or 
infringement,164 potentially resulting in long and costly litigation.165  
While the patent system has been in operation for about 500 years,166 the 
linkage regime has only been in existence for about 25 years following 
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the United States in 1984167 and 
 
160. For an account of the relationship between patents and drug discovery, 
development, and marketing from the earliest days of the industry to the present, see 
generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE 
INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2d ed. 2009). 
161. See generally BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000); 
Bengt Domeij, Initial and Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS, 
LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177•98 (2003).  See also Kenneth Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609•26 (1962); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL 
CONCEPTS IN LAW (2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).  
162. See generally KRIMSKY, supra note 8; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9; Jaffe, 
supra note 10; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10; ANGELL, supra note 7; Kevin Outterson, 
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription 
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. AND ETHICS 193 (2005); Michele Boldrin & 
David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property STAFF REPORT 357 
(Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, M.N.) Feb. 2005, at 102 [hereinafter 
Economics of Ideas]; Keith Pavitt, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America National Policies for Technical Change: Where are the Increasing 
Returns to Economic Research?, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 126 (1996). 
163. Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific Research in the Lead-Up to Invention Vitiate 
Obviousness Under the Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or 
Not to Test?, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–27 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard 2007a]; Bouchard 
2007b, supra note 143; Bouchard KSR Part 1, supra note 119, at 222–46; Thomas Faunce & 
Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and Australia, 4 AUSTL. AND 
N.Z. HEALTH POL’Y 1, 8 (2007); Paul Jones, KSR and the Supreme Court: The Silence is 
Deafening, 53 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 849 (2008). 
164. For a review of Canadian linkage regulations, see infra part I.  See also Bouchard 
2010, supra note 13, at 174–227; Bouchard 2009, supra note 14; Monica Sawicka & Ron A. 
Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug Approval Data 2001–2008: Are 
Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More with Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85, 109 (2009); 
Joel Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy 
and Politics 40 HEALTH POL’Y 69 (1997). 
165. Economics of Ideas, supra note 162. 
166. Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack., Brief, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor 
Countries Pay to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 Ctr. for Global Dev. 1, 1–8 (2004). 
167. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2006) (establishing a list of “Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence” commonly known as the “Orange Book”).  For a description 
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the Canadian NOC Regulations in 1993.168  Importantly, the objective of 
linkage in both originating jurisdictions was to balance the competing 
policy goals of stimulating the development of new and innovative drugs 
and the timely entry of generic drugs.169  
Compared to the patent system, the linkage regime thus represents a 
novel and emerging intellectual property paradigm for protecting 
pharmaceutical inventions.  Even so, by 2010, we are witnessing the 
rapid spread of the linkage regime on a global level, due largely to a 
growing number of multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements with 
the U.S.170 These agreements often require participating nations to 
incorporate linkage and other intellectual property provisions in 
exchange for preferential trade terms.171  As many such agreements are 
negotiated outside the purview of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and provide stronger intellectual property protection for drugs 
than does TRIPS, they are often referred to as “TRIPS-Plus”.172   
Suggestive of the strength of the multinational pharmaceutical lobby, 
the European Commission (E.C.) has recently reported numerous 
instances where member nations have attempted to institute 
pharmaceutical linkage regimes even though E.U. law prohibits this 
 
of U.S. linkage laws, see Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187–94 (1999); Caffrey & 
Rotter, supra, note 155, at 4–7; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and 
Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 
72 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 483 (2003); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 
in 4 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECONOMY: NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (2004); 
Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 90; Mathew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 171 (2008–2009). 
168. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/1993-133 (Can.).  
For early descriptions of Canadian linkage law, see, e.g., Tancer, supra note 4; Harrison, supra 
note 4; Hore, supra note 155. 
169. Avery, supra note 167; Bouchard 2010, supra note 13.  
170. Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access 
to Medicines, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399–404 (2006); Judit Rius Sanjuan, 
Patent-Registration Linkage, DISCUSSION PAPER – NO. 2 (Consumer Project on Tech.), Apr. 
3, 2006, at 1, http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf; Overview on 
Patent Linkage, CONSULTING REPORT, (Finston Consulting, LLC, Washington D.C.) Aug. 7, 
2006, at 1, available at, http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf  (UK 
Consulting Report). 
171. Tomas Alured Faunce, Global Intellectual Property Protection for Innovative 
Pharmaceuticals: Challenges for Bioethics and Health Law, in GLOBALISATION AND HEALTH 
87–108 (2006); Tomas Alured Faunce & Kathy Shats, 62 Bilateral Trade Agreements as 
Drivers of National and Transnational Benefit From Health Technology Policy: Implications 
of Recent US Deals for Australian Negotiations with China and India, AUSTL. J. OF INT’L AFF. 
196–213 (2008). 
172. Correa, supra note 170, at 401. 
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form of intellectual property law.173 
The implications of pharmaceutical linkage for global public health 
are immense.  As reviewed in Section I above, there is growing 
empirical evidence to suggest that pharmaceutical linkage can 
substantially extend cumulative patent terms for high value drugs.174  
These results are consistent with early predictions of the impact of 
linkage regulations by Schondelmeyer,175 based on his work with the 
originating U.S. regime.176  An additional concern is that the extension 
of market exclusivity on brand-name drugs occurs even though up to 
75% of the patents challenged on the merits may be invalid or not 
infringed by the generic equivalent.177  Pharmaceutical linkage creates a 
conflicting system where governments with linkage regimes that limit 
the timely appearance of generics also depend on these firms to produce 
cost savings and limit the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures.178  A 
related issue is that costs of prolonged litigation are known to be passed 
 
173. European Comm’n Pharm. Sector Inquiry, FINAL REP. (EC) July 8, 2009, at 23 
[hereinafter FINAL REP.].  This theme is developed extensively in the European Commission 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report.  See European Comm’n Pharm Sector 
Inquiry., PRELIMINARY REP. (EPO). OCT.  3, 2008, at 14, 113 [hereinafter PRELIMINARY 
REP.]. 
174. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14. 
175. Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist, gave 
evidence before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term of single patents 
that mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively to extend market exclusivity, a 
claim the government at the time vigorously denied.  Compare testimony of Dr. Stephen 
Schondelmeyer (Professor, University of Minnesota) and Dr. Elizabeth Dickson (Director 
General, Chemical and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology).  Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:65–7:96 (Dec. 1, 1992); id. at 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–
8:40 (Dec. 1, 1992).  
176. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 Idea 227, 233 n.27 (2001) (citing The Gale 
Group, Intellectual Property Rules: A Delicate Balancing Act for Drug Development, 23 
CHAIN DRUG REV., RX13 (2001)). 
177. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, FTC STUDY (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n), July 2002, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf, [hereinafter F.T.C. 
Study 2002].  See Hore, supra note 155; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 155, at 40 n.293.  It 
should be noted, however, that these data are now somewhat old, and require updating in 
both the United States and Canada following amendments to the respective linkage regimes 
over the last half decade. 
178. PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 314.  The European Commission states: 
Originator companies may also litigate against pricing and reimbursement bodies, 
claiming patent infringement, irregularities in the generic registration file or 
concerns about bioequivalence or non-compliance of the promotional material.  
However, as described in Chapter C.2.5., when the interventions before the 
marketing authorisation [sic] authorities lead to litigation, originator companies lose 
most of the cases, which suggest that the arguments submitted against the generic 
product could not be substantiated. 
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on to consumers,179 with differential costs to governments and the public 
in accordance with their system of drug reimbursement,180 public 
health,181 public-private discourse,182 and health equity.183   
Considerations such as the forgoing must, of course, be balanced 
against the widely accepted need for innovative drugs in developed and 
developing nations, the presumption favoring the validity of patents in 
most developed nations,184 as well as, the notion in law that if the state 
grants a party an exclusive right, it cannot grant another party 
permission to invade that right without just cause.  For this reason the 
twin policy goals underpinning linkage are said to be “competing” in 
nature. 
In addition to shaping the marketplace for brand-name and generic 
drugs, intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals, including 
linkage, has become a controversial cog in the global machine of 
providing individuals with essential medications, including in 
developed185 and developing186 nations.  Canada, like many developed 
 
179. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9; Bulow, supra note 167. 
180. EXPLORING SOCIAL INSURANCE: CAN A DOSE OF EUROPE CURE CANADIAN 
HEALTH CARE FINANCE? (Colleen Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, eds., 2008); 
CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, (Colleen Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, 
eds., 3d ed. 2007); JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE (Colleen 
Flood, ed. 2006); ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA (Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, 
eds. 2005). 
181. HILTS, supra note 7; AVORN, supra note 7; ANGELL, supra note 7; COHEN, supra 
note 7; RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S 
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2005). 
182. Mary E. Wiktorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: 
Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, and France, 28 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 615, 620 (2003). 
183. See Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, REP. (World 
Health Org.), 2006; Eric Noehrenberg, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health: An Industry Perspective, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., May 2006, at 419; Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub, & Stephanie Diepeveen, 
Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, RAND CORP. (2010); Kevin Outterson, Should 
Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited to Specific Diseases?, 34 Am. J.L. & 
Med. 279, 279-301 (2008).  See generally Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring 
Scientific Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641 (2004); 
Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy about Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., (2004) 14; E. Richard Gold, The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional Competence, 1 
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 263 (2004).  
184. For a critique of the presumption of validity in patent law, see Mark A. Lemley & 
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 
(2007). 
185. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jeffery Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s 
Health: Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 295 JAMA 434, 434–37 (2006). 
186. Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, REP. OF THE COMM’N 
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nations, has attempted to play a key role in the global effort to provide 
underserved populations with essential medications through its Access 
to Medicines Regime,187 but with less success than anticipated.188  
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, up to this point effort has 
been focused primarily on the limits of traditional patent law,189 with 
emerging forms of patent and other regulatory protection receiving 
considerably less attention. 
A related observation is that while the concept of pharmaceutical 
linkage is relatively new compared to the patent system, there is already 
significant pressure to broaden it beyond drug approval to include 
linkage between patent rights and other regulatory aspects of drug 
approval and marketing.190   
One of the major implications of the empirical research reviewed 
from Studies 1, 2, and 3 is that inclusion of linkage in a nation’s basket 
of international trade obligations may present a more expansive notion 
of patent protection for drug products than previously recognized, 
particularly when gauged against the relatively narrow nexus originally 
envisaged between drug patents and the marketed products against 
which they are listed.191  For example, the E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry192 has articulated a broad definition of pharmaceutical linkage, 
 
ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB. HEALTH (World Health Org., Geneva, 
Switzerland), April 25, 2006; Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS 
Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 107–24 (2008); Aaron Kesselheim, Think Globally, 
Prescribe Locally: How Rational Pharmaceutical Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global 
Access to Essential Medicines, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 125, 125-139 (2008). 
187. Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime was established by the Government of 
Canada.  It allows Canada to enact compulsory licenses, despite provisions in the Patent Act 
to the contrary, to export essential medicines to countries without capacity to manufacture the 
same.  The popular front for this effort was the 2004 Act to amend the Patent Act and the 
Food and Drugs Act, also known as the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act.  For more 
information see CANADA’S ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME, http://www.camr-
rcam.gc.ca/index_e.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
188. Jillian Clare Kohler et al., Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Promise or 
Failure of Humanitarian Effort?, 5 HEALTHCARE POL’Y 40, 40–48 (2010). 
189. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal 
Governance Approach, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 401, 401–424 (2004); THE POWER OF PILLS: 
SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING AND PRICING 
(Jillian Clare Cohen, Patricia Illingworth & Udo Schulenk eds., 2006).  
190. FINAL REP., supra note 173; PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173. 
191. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 155; Hore, supra note 155; Bouchard 2009, supra 
note 14. 
192. FINAL REP., supra note 173.  In the Executive Summary, the E.C. states that: 
The Commission will continue to strictly enforce the applicable Community law 
and, for instance, act against patent linkage, as according to Community legislation, 
marketing authorisation [sic] bodies cannot take the patent status of the originator 
medicine into account when deciding on marketing authorisations [sic] of generic 
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including linkage of patent status to the following: formal legal 
proceedings between parties, patent settlements, interventions before 
national drug regulators regarding market approval, drug pricing, and 
reimbursement.193  An evolving landscape such as this raises the question 
of whether the pharmaceutical industry is using linkage as an emerging 
stepping-stone in its efforts to control the movement of drugs across 
international borders.  Moreover, a growing number of legal disputes 
have been reported whereby countries without linkage regulations have 
attempted to import or export drugs where shipments are seized by 
other nations alleging that these shipments are in violation of domestic 
patent laws linked to international trade instruments,194 such as TRIPS 
or other FTAs.195  
 
medicines. 
Id. at 23. 
In the 2008 Preliminary Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that patent-linkage is 
considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No 2001/83.  
PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 14.  Further elaboration is provided to the effect that: 
Patent linkage refers to the practice of linking the granting of MA, the pricing and 
reimbursement status or any regulatory approval for a generic medicinal product, to 
the status of a patent (application) for the originator reference product.  Under EU 
law, it is not allowed to link marketing authorisation [sic] to the patent status of the 
originator reference product.  Article 81 of the Regulation and Article 126 of the 
Directive provide that authoriation [sic] to market a medicinal product shall not be 
refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set out in the Regulation and 
the Directive.  Since the status of a patent (application) is not included in the 
grounds set out in the Regulation and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an 
argument for refusing, suspending or revoking MA. 
Id. at 113–14. 
193. PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 22–23. The report states: 
Interventions before regulatory bodies (marketing authorisation [sic] authorities 
and pricing and reimbursement bodies) appear to be a standard tool in originator 
companies’ toolbox.  Although contacting the health authorities may address 
legitimate concerns, it can also be used to delay or block the marketing 
authorisation [sic] or the pricing or reimbursement status of the generic product.  In 
particular, by suggesting that the generic product is less efficient or safe or is not 
equivalent, raising patent infringement issues concerning the generic product in 
question and alleging that any decision favourable [sic] to the generic company 
would make the authorities liable to patent infringement damages (patent linkage), 
originator companies gain time and can create delays in granting marketing 
approval for the generic product and its entry into the market.  
Id. at 314. 
194. See NAFTA, supra note 2; TRIPS, supra note 2.  
195.  For example, a 2008 shipment of the anti-HIV drug Abacavir was confiscated by 
Dutch customs authorities.  The shipment was from an Indian company bound for Nigeria.  It 
was paid for by UNITAID, the drug purchase arm of the WHO and was meant to be 
distributed by the William J. Clinton Foundation.  See, e.g., Posting of GenericIPguy to 
Indian Patent Oppositions: Abacavir Hemisulfate - Indian pre grant opposition documents, 
http://indianpatentoppositions.blogspot.com/2007/11/abacavir-hemisulfate-indian-pre-
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Owing to the confluence of the events reviewed above over time, 
linkage regulations in respect to therapeutic products have quietly 
emerged as key driver of public health costs and medical product 
regulation on the global stage, both for developed and developing 
nations.  
The Author is a member of a new global consortium of intellectual 
property and health policy scholars, economists, and practicing lawyers 
in nine counties (Consortium), who have come together to study global 
pharmaceutical linkage regulation.196   
When the Consortium began its work, the obvious question to ask 
was—what should the focus be of future research on pharmaceutical 
linkage as it evolves globally away from its North American roots?  In 
its work thus far,197 the Consortium recognizes that the study of 
structure-function relationships in living systems, both at the micro and 
macro level, has served empirical science especially well over the last 
century.  Indeed, the rapid spread of pharmaceutical linkage worldwide 
offers a unique and time sensitive opportunity to carry out empirical 
work on the system as it evolves globally from its point of origin in the 
United States.  A major goal of our work on global pharmaceutical 
linkage will be to investigate the structural and functional aspects of 
different systems of linkage regulations in different jurisdictions, and 
their relationship on the one hand to drug availability costs, and 
expenditures, and incentives for innovation and protection of 
intellectual property rights on the other.  
Key decision makers, pharmaceutical firms, the courts, patent 
counsel, consumers, and other actors are assumed to interact in 
 
grant.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007, 02:24); EUR-Lex - 32003R1383-EN, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1383:EN:HTML (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2010 02:14).   
196. The consortium is spread across nations with mature linkage regulations (United 
States and Canada), nascent regulations (Australia and China), those without regulations but 
with certain practices that may operate to parallel linkage (E.U.), and those where both the 
existence and scope of linkage regulations are currently the subject of intense public scrutiny 
and litigation (India, Mexico, and South Korea).  It includes individuals with past and present 
litigation experience with pharmaceutical regulations on both sides of the brand-generic 
divide, and includes scholars appointed in faculties of law, medicine, health, and economics as 
well as practicing lawyers working in law firms and non-governmental organizations on 
pharmaceutical matters.  The consortium is fortunate to be supported in its endeavors by a 
Key Decision Maker Advisory Board (KDMAB) composed of senior members of government 
in health, industry, and intellectual property portfolios and the judiciary working on matters 
relating to pharmaceutical linkage regulations.  
197. Bouchard, R.A. Cahoy, D., Domeij, B., Dutfield, G., Faunce, T., Hollis, A., Jones, 
P., Ali Khader, F., Lexchin, J., Nam, H., & Serrano, J.L. “Global Pharmaceutical Linkage 
Regulations: A Consortium Framework.” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
12(2): 1-30. 2011. 
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domestic and global networks through reasonably well-defined channels 
of communication.198  As in other complex political and economic 
systems,199 this network is assumed to have structural and functional 
characteristics that can be identified and measured, and which in turn 
serve as appropriate benchmarks to assess the performance of the 
system relative to its goals and objectives.   
The specific basket of legal checks and balances in a given linkage 
regime is pivotal, as it determines not only how a complex system of 
pharmaceutical regulation begins operating de novo following the 
coming into force of law but also, how it evolves over time to yield 
demonstrable empirical results.  It has been previously shown, for 
example, that the behavior of dynamic legal systems,200 including how 
systems learn, self-regulate, and adapt and grow,201 is strongly influenced 
by positive and negative feedback.202  Positive feedback is feedback that 
results in growth or amplification of a particular process or group of 
related processes whereas negative feedback results in tamping or 
slowing of a particular process or group of processes.  Studies of 
complex social, biological, and technological systems have shown that 
the unintended consequences resulting from feedback has the potential 
to force a system away from operating at or near the point of 
efficiency.203 
We have used the term “structural” to refer to the broad 
administrative, legal, and policy attributes of the linkage regime in 
differing jurisdictions as these represent the initial starting conditions 
for operation of local linkage regimes.  The initial starting conditions, as 
 
198. Drahos, supra note 189. 
199. Harrison, supra note 4; JERVIS, supra note 32; Bozeman & Sarewitz, supra note 
81; Bozeman, supra note 81; Sterman, supra note 80. 
200. Neil E. Harrison, Thinking About the World we Make, in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD 
POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 1, 10 (Neil E. Harrison ed., 
2006) [hereinafter COMPLEXITY]; JERVIS, supra note 32. 
201. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the 
Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
1407 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 21 (2005–2006). 
202. Feedback interactions in complex systems have received increased attention in 
recent years.  See generally Barabási, supra note 142; Gleick, supra note 142; Holland 1992, 
supra note 142; Holland 1995, supra note 142; Johnson, supra note 142; Kauffman, supra note 
142; Nicolis & Prigogine, supra note 142; Waldrop, supra note 142; Arthur, supra note 142, at 
92–99. 
203. See, e.g., Robert M. May et al., Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers, 451 
NATURE 893 (2008).  For a look at the role of feedback in policy failure, see generally JERVIS, 
supra note 32; COMPLEXITY, supra note 200; Bozeman, supra note 81; Bozeman & Sarewitz, 
supra note 81; and Sterman, supra note 80.  
142 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 15:1 
 
in dynamical physical systems,204 represent the sum of the political, 
economic, and public policy conditions that together form the “take-off” 
point for a new law and the conditions in which it begins to operate.  
The structural aspect also encompasses the specific legal mechanisms 
that drive operation of linkage regimes in various jurisdictions.  
Identifying the structural attributes and mechanisms of individual 
linkage systems is important, as they provide the benchmark from which 
to assess the successes and failures of each system in operation and their 
potential to combine to form a global regulatory regime.  By contrast, 
we use the term “functional” to refer to the outputs of the regulations in 
each jurisdiction as well as how they functionally interact across borders 
to operate as a global regulatory regime.  The functional aspects of a 
system reflect the behavior of the system as it evolves with time away 
from the initial starting conditions.205   
A significant advantage of a globally-based Consortium approach to 
the study of pharmaceutical linkage is that studying linkage in different 
jurisdictions allows for both an investigation of the structural and 
functional characteristics of local linkage regimes with different initial 
starting conditions and different legal mechanisms of operation, the 
identification of general rules of linkage as the different national forms 
of linkage interact and influence global pharmaceutical regulation.  The 
former provides a descriptive mechanism for assessing the successes and 
failures of different regimes, while the latter provides a prescriptive 
approach for key decision makers to revise, institute, or abolish linkage 
regulations according to the goals and objectives of differing nations.   
The goal of the Consortium’s future work on global pharmaceutical 
linkage is to produce and use empirical knowledge relating to the 
structure and function of different linkage regimes as a knowledge 
translation tool for assessing the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and 
failures of pharmaceutical linkage in individual nations and as they 
combine to form a global system of pharmaceutical linkage.  A 
secondary goal is to directly assist key decision-makers and knowledge 
users in domestic and global governments and legal systems working 
 
204. See generally Barabási, supra note 142; Gleick, supra note 142; Holland 1992, 
supra note 142; Holland 1995, supra note 142; Johnson, supra note 142; Kauffman, supra note 
142; Nicolis & Prigogine, supra note 142; Waldrop, supra note 142; Arthur, supra note 142, at 
92–99. 
205. COMPLEXITY, supra note 200; JERVIS, supra note 32; see also, Clifford Shearing & 
Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens,’ 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 400, 
401–06; LES JOHNSTON & CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY: EXPLORATIONS 
IN POLICING AND JUSTICE ch. 8, 138 (2003); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and 
Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004); Drahos, supra note 189. 
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with linkage regimes in their efforts to stimulate the production of new 
and innovative drugs while at the same time lowering public health costs 
and increasing access to essential medicines. 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Our empirical investigation into the nexus between drug approval, 
drug patenting, patent listing, and litigation under the domestic 
Canadian linkage regime for pharmaceuticals has yielded a number of 
important observations.  Primary among these is that the development, 
approval, and marketing of new and innovative breakthrough drugs 
have stagnated in favor of follow-on drug development.  The number of 
truly innovative drugs is very low, representing about 1.87% of all 
brand-name submissions and 1.23% of total submissions.  This trend has 
been ongoing for about a decade and appears to have occurred 
independent of concomitant changes in firm patenting, patent listing, 
and patent litigation.  The second primary observation is that operation 
of the linkage regime over the same timeframe has resulted in a 
doubling of cumulative patent protection for blockbuster drugs, from an 
average term of twenty-two years to a term of forty-three years.  
Extended patent protection under the NOC Regulations was associated 
with a substantial degree of litigation, often resulting in opposing 
decisions on validity or infringement at the same level of court.  Unlike 
the U.S. linkage regime, litigation in Canada is deemed to be judicial 
review in nature.  Thus generic firms, while successful on issues of 
validity or infringement under linkage laws, remain vulnerable to a post 
hoc infringement action.  There is little question as to whether these 
costs are passed on to consumers in the form of monopoly prices.  
Together the data show that the production of new and innovative drugs 
is low and decreasing over time, domestic pharmaceutical companies are 
focused more on appropriating existing technologies than on 
breakthrough drug development, and that generic entry on high value 
drugs is being increasingly delayed.  
The empirical findings reviewed here are at odds with the intent of 
the federal government in enacting the NOC Regulations to stimulate 
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitate the timely 
entry of generic drugs.  Questions as to the validity of the NOC 
Regulations arise when a purposive patent-specific approach to 
interpreting the NOC Regulations is taken, as stipulated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in its leading patent jurisprudence.  Taking 
this approach to analysis of the linkage of drug approval and drug 
patenting in the specific infringement context of Section 55.2(1) of 
Canada’s Patent Act, one could argue that the concept of early working 
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does not refer to the working of any patent at any time.  As suggested 
by testimony by the federal government before the Legislative 
Committee on Bill C-91, the early working provision was intended to 
refer to a specific patent on a specific drug so as to allow generic firms 
to prepare for timely market entry in relation to that drug and that 
patent.  A second element of a patent-specific analysis is that a drug 
referred in Section 55.2(1) is not a new and innovative drug for the 
purposes of all time.  It is a drug that is new and innovative at a 
particular time in history.  The moment when this drug is no longer new 
or innovative, for example when it becomes the basis of SNDS 
submissions and follow-on drugs, constitutes the moment in history 
when patents are no longer in relation to new and innovative drugs, and 
thus, the moment which may reasonably trigger timely generic entry.  
A similar conclusion may be drawn from the legal debate 
surrounding the coming into force of the U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime, 
particularly with respect to influential reports from the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce and the Committee on the Judiciary preceding 
the legislation. 
Relegating listing only to specific drug submissions considered to be 
“new and innovative” based on objective evidence rather than in an 
arbitrary manner on all new (NDS) and follow-on (SNDS) submissions, 
would be in line with the spirit of the regulations to encourage the 
development of new and innovative drugs and to facilitate the timely 
entry of generic alternatives.  The same is true of the multiple patent 
listing model, whereby listings could be pruned by regulators only to the 
small number of patents associated with demonstrably new and 
innovative drugs.  Amendments such as these would accord with the 
framework for the linkage regime put forward by the Canadian 
government in the lead-up to Bill C-91 as well as reports by the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on the 
Judiciary in the United States in the lead-up to Hatch Waxman.  At the 
time both pieces of legislation came into force, U.S. and Canadian 
governments strongly asserted that linkage protection was aimed at a 
narrow range of patents on new and innovative drugs, and when that 
narrow range of patents expire, anyone in a position to copy that 
product can legally bring it to market.  As discussed above in greater 
detail, the language used by both governments is consistent with the 
plain meaning of the terms “new and innovative” and “timely.” 
In choosing the words “the development of new and innovative 
drugs” to be one-half of the balance linking patent law to food and drug 
law, federal governments in the United States and Canada articulated a 
clear public policy goal that pioneering drug development is desired in 
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exchange for the “unusual protections” afforded to the pharmaceutical 
industry by the linkage regime.  Similarly, in choosing the words “timely 
market entry of their lower priced generic competitors” these 
governments articulated a second public policy goal of cost savings, 
triggered by expiry of specific patents on specific drug forms that are no 
longer new and innovative.  Thus the balance sought to be effected by 
pharmaceutical linkage is not just a qualitative balance between poles, 
but also a quantitative balance.  The more reward there is on the private 
side of the ledger, the more there must be on the public side in order to 
maintain a valid legal equilibrium.  
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate that, when analyzed in 
its “real world” context, the Canadian linkage regulations are not 
working either as intended by Parliament at the time the law was passed 
or in a manner that is consistent with the goals and objectives of the 
federal government as articulated in later RIAS documents.  Private 
firms are obtaining extended patent protection for weakly inventive 
products, while at the same time generic competition is markedly 
delayed.  The result is that pharmaceutical firms are reaping the rewards 
of intellectual property protection at historically high levels in this 
country while the public (and institutional payers) is being deprived of 
reasonably priced pharmaceuticals.  
In light of the principle of statutory interpretation that legislation 
should be understood and assessed objectively in the setting in which it 
operates, it is possible that the operation of the NOC Regulations as 
currently constituted breaches the quid pro quo of the traditional patent 
bargain from a patent-specific perspective.  Based on the same 
reasoning and evidence one might conclude that the linkage regime 
does not rectify the mischief it was intended to remedy, and thus may 
yield a result that is at odds with legislative intent. 
Finally, data such as those in Studies 1, 2, and 3 suggest that blending 
of industrial and health policy goals may be ineffective and possibly 
counterproductive in terms of public health outcomes.  Particularly 
worrisome is the potential for linkage loopholes permitting a 
“paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting nexus,” whereby the largest 
degree of market exclusivity is provided on products with the least 
amount of innovation.  The Article provides a theory of how this may 
occur within the context of pharmaceutical linkage, via the development 
of “product clusters.”  
There is no question that established and emerging drug regulatory 
regimes have great potential to increase the efficiency of public health 
provision by placing both new and innovative and older blockbuster 
remedies in clinical environments sooner.  However, a growing body of 
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evidence, including data reviewed here, seems to indicate that the 
efficacy of this approach can be weakened through inadequate 
monitoring and supervision, such that pharmaceutical firms perceive a 
higher incentive to exploit existing patented technologies in new ways 
rather than increasing the flow of new technologies.  At a more general 
level, the data lend empirical substance to an emerging consensus that, 
in many circumstances, intellectual property rights may be an inhibitor 
of innovation in so far as this term is construed to yield the greatest 
social benefits for the public. 
It is concluded that policy and legislative incentives designed to 
stimulate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry have had the 
opposite effect, and that shifting to a lifecycle regulatory model is 
unlikely to alter this scenario absent effort to balance economic 
incentives for breakthrough and follow-on drug development.  
Importantly, the findings presented in the Article do not suggest 
unusual behavior by pharmaceutical firms.  Rather, the data point to the 
failure of policy incentives intended to induce the desired result, namely 
stimulating the development of new and pioneering drugs while also 
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs and thus access to essential 
and affordable medicines.  
As discussed in greater detail elsewhere,206 it is possible that 
unintended consequences such as those reported here have come about, 
at least in part, as a result of the discrete system of legal checks and 
balances comprising the domestic linkage regime, particularly when the 
balance of “pro-brand” and “pro-generic” provisions in the Canadian 
system of linkage are compared to those employed in other 
jurisdictions. 
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